Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethnopolitics of Conflict and Compromise

12 The Struggle for Kirkuk: Future Governance

Chapter 12 The Struggle for Kirkuk Future Governance The key issue to be addressed in assessing the future governance of Kirkuk is whether power is to be shared among the governorate’s various ethnic communities and if so, to what extent and how? Power sharing does not distill neatly into a dichotomy, and there is a spectrum of possibilities , raging from total majority control at one end to power sharing on the basis of strict equality for all groups at the other. Nonetheless, as a first cut, it is useful to package the concept of power sharing into a dichotomy based on the distinction between majority control and meaningful power sharing. Similar to Figures 11.1 and 11.5 in Chapter 11, Figure 12.1, representing four possible futures for Kirkuk, can then be constructed. In the previous chapter it was established that a compromise solution will likely involve a special status for Kirkuk, whether inside or outside the Kurdistan Region. Figure 12.1 illustrates the four remaining possibilities for Kirkuk’s final status. In quadrant 1, Kirkuk enjoys special autonomous status inside the Kurdistan Region, and a deal is cut whereby formal power-sharing arrangements are adopted for its governance. Quadrant 2 sees Kirkuk inside the Kurdistan Region with autonomous Inside KR (special status) Power Sharing Majority Control 2 1 Outside KR (special status) 4 3 Figure 12.1. Future governance preferences for Kirkuk Future Governance 205 Power Sharing (Kurds, other groups) Majority Control (Kurds, other groups) Inside KR (special status) (Kurds, other groups) 1 2, 3 2 1, 4 Outside KR (special status) (Kurds, other groups) 3 4, 1 4 3, 2 Figure 12.2. Group preferences for the governance of Kirkuk status but without any formal mechanism for power sharing. Thus, assuming that they constitute an electoral majority, the Kurds control the governance of the governorate. Quadrant 3 invests Kirkuk with special autonomous status and envisages formal power-sharing arrangements but locates it outside the territory of the Kurdistan Region. Quadrant 4 sees an autonomous Kirkuk outside the Kurdistan Region and under majority (presumably Kurdish) control. Assigning groups preferences to each of the outcomes depicted in Figure 12.1 is reasonably straightforward. The distribution of preferences depicted in the figure is rooted in three uncontroversial assumptions: first, that each group prefers to maximize its share of governing power relative to other groups; second, that the Kurds comprise an electoral majority; and third, that all groups care more intensely about the location of Kirkuk than the manner of its governance. Based on these assumptions, Figure 12.2 shows group preferences for each of the four possible futures. For the Kurds, the most preferred outcome is quadrant 2, in which Kirkuk is located within the boundary of the Kurdistan Region and subject to majority (presumably Kurdish) control. The only compromise involved in this outcome on the part of the Kurds is the assignment of special status to Kirkuk within the region. This would require amending the draft constitution of the Kurdistan Region to designate autonomous powers of governance to Kirkuk. Beyond this, the Kurds may choose to share power to a greater or lesser degree, but they are not institutionally obligated to do so. There are two major problems with this outcome. First, although it would clearly be possible to invest the Kirkuk government with wide-ranging powers over issues such as culture, education, and even security, and it would not be difficult to embed these in the Kurdish constitution in a way that prevents their easy revocation by Erbil, it is less clear that these powers would be meaningful in practice. 206 Future of Kirkuk It seems almost inevitable that the two major Kurdish parties that dominate the KRG would also dominate the governance of Kirkuk. If the two main parties control both governments, then any legal autonomy guaranteed (however robustly) in the constitution is no longer meaningful. To put this another way, meaningful autonomy would empower the Kirkuk government in certain areas to make decisions independent of and if necessary, contrary to the wishes of the KRG in Erbil. Though it is not beyond the realm of possibility, it is not particularly plausible that the Kirkuk branches of the two main parties could act in defiance of Erbil. The only other possibility is for an indigenous political movement of Kirkuki Kurds to emerge to challenge KDP and PUK dominance. Again, this seems highly...