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Chapter 7 Thinking About Asymmetry and Symmetry in the Remaking of Iraq Brendan O’Leary The English poet John Keats told us that Beauty is truth, truth beauty,—that is all Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know. (“Ode on a Grecian Urn”) Sadly, however, many psychologists tell us that we judge beauty by people’s symmetry, not their truthfulness (Swami and Furnham 2007). The concept of symmetry, and its antonym asymmetry, contains both aesthetic and geometric ammunition. Symmetry suggests balanced form or balanced measure; asymmetry suggests the unbalanced, or the ill proportioned. Symmetry is also linked to the idea of correspondence: entities on opposite sides of a center, axis, dividing line, or mirror, symmetrically correspond. Symmetry and asymmetry are now attached to the literature on territorial constitutional design. Within this literature asymmetrical entities suffer from the presumption that they are ill proportioned, imbalanced, and irregular. The reasonableness of that judgment is the subject of this book, and most of my coauthors question the negative appraisal of asymmetrical federations with solid arguments and empirically convincing observations. This chapter, in contrast, offers a skeptical scrutiny of the symmetry-versus-asymmetry debate. I argue that debate over symmetry and asymmetry cannot reasonably be confined to any one dimension of formal power; that the notions of symmetry and asymmetry themselves are typically not rigorously defined; and that their practical importance may be overrated. The chapter is not, however, an exercise in negativity: I try to put forth reasonable and operational conceptions of symmetry and asymmetry. But the suggestion will be made that all actual federations are asymmetrical in at least one respect. Therefore, perhaps, not too much weight should be attached to asymmetry per se in accounting for the 184 Brendan O’Leary success or otherwise of federations in resolving or regulating national, ethnic , linguistic, or religious conflict. It remains possible that the number and degrees of asymmetry may matter—though how, exactly, is not clear. What definitely matters in the places deeply divided along the cleavages just mentioned is whether they are organized in pluralist federations ; or whether they have consociational power-sharing arrangements. Pluralist federations are plurinational, decentralized, and consensual, whereas integrated federations are mononational, centralized, and majoritarian (O’Leary 2005b). A pluralist federation may not guarantee harmony, but it may help resolve or regulate national, ethnic, religious, or linguistic conflicts. Cross-community executive power sharing, proportionality , autonomy, and veto rights characterize full consociations. These can be contrasted with single-party winner-takes-all executives, majoritarian electoral rules, unitary and uniform centralization, and the absence of veto powers for any agent other than the governing majority (Lijphart 1977; O’Leary 2005a). Consociational arrangements also do not guarantee harmony but may help resolve or regulate national, ethnic, religious, or linguistic conflicts. A political “balance of power” may be vital to the effective workings of both pluralist federations and consociations. But such a political balance need not resemble aesthetic or geometric notions of symmetry, nor rest on formal constitutional symmetry. I shall suggest that both “symmetrical” and “asymmetrical” formulas can be used to help the pluralist and consociational medicine go down. But it is the medicine that matters, and the patient’s willingness to complete the course prescribed. Whether the sugar crystals that coat the medicine are symmetrical or asymmetrical is irrelevant—unless the patient irrationally attaches great importance to them. The constitutional reconstruction of Iraq that is still underway will be used to illustrate these suggestions. Symmetry in federal design is often used as a synonym for equality, and asymmetry is often treated as a synonym for unequal—or different. There are at least two forms of inequality that might take a federal system away from symmetry: inequality in the constitutional powers of the federated units (generally called regions below ), or inequality in the extent to which the regions share power within the federal government. Let us call the first of these asymmetrical powers, and the second asymmetrical shares. We then have two different ways of measuring reductions in the degree of asymmetry in federations. Definition A: Asymmetry is reduced to the degree that the federated entities are equalized in their formal constitutional powers of self-government (powers). Definition B: Asymmetry is reduced to the degree that the federated entities are equalized in their formal constitutional powers within the federal government (shares). [3.141.24.134] Project MUSE (2024-04-24 08:07 GMT) The Remaking of Iraq 185 It follows...

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