Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis

THE MOVEMENT BEYOND PHILOSOPHIC HERMENEUTICS

150 Beyond Objectivism and Relativism are in the process of becoming. Gadamer seeks to show us that authentic hermeneutical understanding becomes integral to our very being and transforms what we are in process of becoming, just as phronesis determines the being of the phronimos. This stress on the moment of appropriation in hermeneutical understanding enables us to see why Gadamer believes that the Geisteswissenschaften , when truly practiced, are practical-moral disciplines . As hermeneutical disciplines, they are not primarily directed toward amassing theoretical, "objective" knowledge. Rather, while hermeneutical understanding does require theoretical distancing, it also involves the type of appropriation characteristic of phronesis.49 The type of knowledge and truth that hermeneutics yields is practical knowledge and truth that shapes our praxis (we will soon explicitly examine the question of truth). This also helps to explain why for Gadamer the "chief task" of philosophic hermeneutics is to "correct the peculiar falsehood of modern consciousness" and "to defend practical and political reason against the domination of technology based on science." It is the scientism of our age and the false idolatry of the expert that pose the threat to practical and political reason. The task of philosophy today is to elicit in us the type of questioning that can become a counterforce against the contemporary deformation of praxis. It is in this sense that "hermeneutic philosophy is the heir of the older tradition of practical philosophy." THE MOVEMENT BEYOND PHILOSOPHIC HERMENEUTICS I have indicated that Gadamer's appropriation of the tradition of practical philosophy is not without tensions and problems. If we take Gadamer seriously and press his own claims, they lead us beyond philosophic hermeneutics. But before I begin my immanent critiquea critique that takes Gadamer's arguments seriously and draws out their conclusions-it is important to remember that in 7Iuth and Method Gadamer's primary concern is with the understanding and interpretation of works of art, texts, and tradition, with "what is handed down to us." Ethics and politics are not in the foreground of his investigations. Even his discussion of Aristotle is introduced only insofar as it helps to illuminate the hermeneutical phenomenon. But it is also clear that if we pay close attention to Gadamer's writings before and after the publication of 7Iuth and Method, we will see that from his very earliest to his most recent writings he has consis- 151 From Hermeneutics to Praxis tently shown a concern with ethics and politics, especially with what we can learn from Greek philosophy. In his writings since the publication of 7tuth and Method, Gadamer has returned again and again to the dialectical interplay of hermeneutics and praxis. When we enlarge our horizon and consider the implications of what he is saying for a contemporary understanding of praxis, a number of difficulties come into sharp relief. Let me begin with a consideration of the meaning of truth for Gadamer, then move to his conception of criticism. This will allow us to take a close look at some of the difficulties with his appropriation of phronesis. Finally, we can tum to Gadamer's reflections on dialogue and freedom. Although the concept of truth is basic to Gadamer's entire project of philosophic hermeneutics, it turns out to be one of the most elusive concepts in his work. After all, a primary intention of 7tuth and Method is to elucidate and defend the legitimacy of speaking of the "truth" of works of art, texts, and tradition. Gadamer tells us that it was not his aim to playoff Method against Truth, but rather to show that there is "an entirely different notion of knowledge and truth"50 which is not exhausted by the achievements of scientific method and which is available to us through hermeneutical understanding . The appeal to truth-a truth that enables us to go beyond our own historical horizon through a fusion of horizons-is absolutely essential in order to distinguish philosophic hermeneutics from a historicist form of relativism. Gadamer concludes 'Ituth and Method with strong claims about this distinctive type of truth. Thus there is undoubtedly no understanding that is free of all prejudices, however much the will of our knowledge must be directed towards escaping their thrall. It has emerged throughout our investigation that the certainty that is imparted by the use of scientific methods does not suffice to guarantee truth. This is so especially of the human sciences, but this does not mean a dimunition of their scientific quality, but, on the contrary, the...