Notes
Notes Introduction: The Politics of Decolonization and the Evolution of the International Human Rights Project Epigraph: Humphrey, On the Edge of Greatness, vol. 2, 129, 135. 1. Humphrey, On the Edge of Greatness, vol. 2, 129. 2. Glendon, A World Made New; Cmiel, “Human Rights, Freedom of Information , and the Origins of Third World Solidarity”; Lauren, Power and Prejudice ; Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights; Waltz, “Universalizing Human Rights”; Waltz, “Reclaiming and Rebuilding the History of the Universal Declaration”; Waltz, “Universal Human Rights.” 3. Abdullah, “UN Charter Review”; “Mahathir Warns of Superpowers’ ScareTactics on Human Rights Review.” 4. Mutua, Human Rights, 19. 5. Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire, 300. 6. Afshari, “On Historiography of Human Rights.” For comments on anticolonialism and human rights, see especially 51–55. 7. Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights, 174. 8. Henkin, “The United Nations and Human Rights,” 512. 9. Quentin-Baxter, “International Protection of Human Rights,” 136. 10. Ibid., 137. 11. Humphrey, On the Edge of Greatness, vol. 3, 8. 12. Report on the Third Committee of the General Assembly: 14 October–22 December 1952, 7 April 1953, 20–21, 320.13/14-753, Decimal File 1950–1954; General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59 (RG 59), NACP. 13. Ibid., 20. 14. Ibid., 21. 15. This was a theme Humphrey returned to a number of times. In his diary entry of 17 November 1950, he again expressed his frustration at the lack of Western leadership. “My diagnosis remains the same. The great powers by their failure to accept their responsibilities lost leadership in the committee to countries like Mexico (Noriega), Pakistan (Bokhari) and Saudi Arabia (Baroody).” Humphrey was also highly critical of the consequences that flowed from Western neglect, and the rise of the so-called “little politicians”: “The Arab bloc together with India (Mrs. [Lakshmi] Menon) have provided the leadership which the U.S.A., the U.K. and France abdicated; and that leadership has been incompetent, mediocre and irresponsible. My language is strong but not too strong. Little politicians have played havoc with great humanitarian questions.” Humphrey, On the Edge of Greatness, vol. 2, 129, 131, 133, 143, 167; vol. 4, 15. 12417 Decolonization & Evolution of Inter Human Rights.indd 151 12417 Decolonization & Evolution of Inter Human Rights.indd 151 10/19/09 1:49:55 PM 10/19/09 1:49:55 PM 152 Notes to Pages 8–11 16. Ibid., vol. 2, 288. 17. Teltsch, “Private Appeals to the UN Barred.” 18. Radio Transcript, “Today with Mrs. Roosevelt,” 14 May 1950, 11, Charles Malik Collection, Box 39, File 8, Correspondence, Roosevelt, Eleanor, 1947– 1960. 19. Malik persistently argued for greater Western leadership. At a speech at the Carnegie Endowment Round Table of World Affairs in September 1951, he again exhorted a more proactive Western policy: “You simply cannot afford to stand aside and plunging into the midst of things,” and “you cannot afford to trail behind either.” Human Rights in the United Nations, Address to the Round Table on World Affairs in Extension Education of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 19 September 1951, 6, Charles Malik Collection, Box 79, File 3, Seventh Session, Commission, Human Rights, Speeches and Writings, 1951. 20. Office Memorandum, Committee Three Activities—Delegate and Staff Comments, 27 December 1957, 2, 320.13/12-2757, Decimal File 1955–1959; General Records of the Department of State, RG 59; NACP. 21. Ibid., 4. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. 24. Humphrey, On the Edge of Greatness, vol. 3, 103. 25. Anderson, Eyes Off the Prize, 237. 26. Ibid., 239. Reports from the Commission on Human Rights were scathing about the “action plan” Lord introduced so unsuccessfully. “Neither of the United Kingdom and Australian delegations has been prepared to promise support for any of these proposals. . . . General objections to the proposals are—(a) that they would tend to be a substitute for action to complete, adopt, and implement , the Covenant, and indeed they are intended to be so far as U.S.A. itself is concerned; (b) that they would be superfluous in the event of the completion, adoption and implementation of the Covenant; and (c) that they are, in reality, but a political device to placate public opinion that has been disturbed by the Presidential withdrawal of support of the Covenant. Particular objections to (1) are . . . the reports would be innocuous and useless.” From Australian Mission to the United Nations, Regarding US Human Rights Action Plan, 25 July 1954...
OR
