Notes
Notes Chapter 1 1. Borshch is a classic Russian dish while besbarmak is a classic Kazakh dish. 2. Chokan Valikhanov was a nineteenth-century Russian army officer who studied Central Asian history; Abai Kunabaev was a nineteenth-century poet who launched Kazakh as a literary language. 3. The poem is published in Svetlana Nazarova, Ne ostavliaite na potom. . . . (Almaty: Stikhotvoreniia, 2005), 20–21. 4. Author’s interview, 27 June 2000. 5. Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, ‘‘Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda,’’ Perspectives on Politics 2, 4 (December 2004): 725. 6. For a complete discussion of these methods, see John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, ‘‘Introduction: The Macro-Political Regulation of Ethnic Con- flict,’’ in John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, eds., The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts. (London: Routledge, 1993), 4–37. 7. The titular nation is the nation after which each union republic of the Soviet federation was named. I use the words titular and core interchangeably in reference to the non-Russian group in question. 8. Exit and voice are Albert Hirschman’s terms. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge , Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970). 9. My definition of an opportunity structure differs from the social movement literature definition, which concerns a set of conditions that facilitate political mobilization. For more on this view of political opportunity structures, see Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 10. Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, ‘‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,’’ in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds., Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1992), 2. 11. Helmke and Levitsky, ‘‘Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics,’’ 727. 12. Helmke and Levitsky take seriously Douglass North’s point that we need to distinguish informal organizations from informal institutions. North’s distinction lies in the difference between the actors (informal organizations) and the rules that govern their behavior (informal institutions). See Douglass C. North, 190 Notes to Pages 9–14 Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Helmke and Levitsky, ‘‘Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics’’; and Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, eds., Informal Institutions and Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 4–8. 13. Alena V. Ledeneva, Russia’s Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 3. 14. Ibid., 186–87. 15. The following discussion of complementary and competing institutions is based on Helmke and Levitsky’s typology of informal institutions, which stems from the interaction of formal and informal institutions and suggests four types of informal institutions: complementary, accommodating, substitutive, and competing . For more on this typology, see Helmke and Levitsky, ‘‘Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics.’’ 16. For more on this method, which compares cases that contrast on a series of independent variables, see Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (Malabar: Krieger Publishing Company, 1982). 17. King, Keohane, and Verba argue that the best research design ‘‘selects observations to ensure variation in the explanatory variable (and any control variables) without regard to the values of the dependent variable.’’ Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 140. 18. Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 41. 19. In 1989 the Latvian SSR population was 52 percent Latvian and 34 percent Russian. See Results of the 2000 Population and Housing Census in Latvia (Riga: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, 2002), 121. In 1989 the Kyrgyz SSR population was 52 percent Kyrgyz and 21.5 percent Russian. See Osnovnyye itogi Pervoi natsional’noi perepisi naseleniia Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki 1999 goda (Bishkek: Natsional’nyi statisticheskiii komitet Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki, 2000), 26. 20. The appendix contains each set of interview questions. 21. Anatoly M. Khazanov, After the USSR: Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), 268. 22. Laitin uses the term ‘‘Russian-speakers’’ and Melvin uses the term ‘‘Russi- fied settler communities.’’ See David Laitin, Identity in Formation: The RussianSpeaking Populations in the Near Abroad (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), and Neil Melvin, Russians Beyond Russia: The Politics of National Identity (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995). 23. Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding...
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