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Introduction
- University of Pennsylvania Press
- Chapter
- Additional Information
Introduction The following chapters explore language, creativity, the brain, technology transfer, Chinese writing, and the processes that link these elements together . A personal anecdote will help bring the relationship into focus. In 1997 I sat through a presentation on intracompany "teams," the latest panacea hawked by management consultants for making America more competitive. The facilitator was giving her pitch for the new program and offered the following proof of its superiority. "Think back four decades ago to Japan," she said. "How would you characterize that country's products then?" "Cheap." From one of the attendees. "Imitative." Another voice. "Do I hear low-tech?" "Low-tech." The ritual continued until the facilitator elicited a host of unflattering stereotypes that described the sort of production done in Japan in the immediate postwar period, before its manufacturers adopted a team approach . What came next was mostly predictable: "And how would you describe Japanese products today?" "First-rate." "Superior technology." "High value-added." And so on around the room, until one wag blurted out: "Imitative." "Imitative?" "They're still copying from everybody like before." 2 Introduction A lively exchange followed, ending in a consensus among the attendees that creativity is a part of the entrepreneurial act not necessarily served by a team approach, and one that has not been mastered byJapan even now. The conclusion clearly was out of step with the facilitator's agenda, and a year earlier the wag wouldn't have gotten away with it. All indications then were that Japan was satisfying the world's appetite for high-tech novelty better than any other country. But this was 1997, and signs of trouble were showing. Massive evidence painstakingly compiled by u.s. lawyers and trade experts confirmed what revisionist authors like Prestowitz (1988), van Wolferen (1989), and Fallows (1995) had claimed aboutJapan's export drive being artificially subsidized by a closed and captive domestic market.1 Bankruptcies, a falling stock index, and lackluster economic growth-new phenomena inJapancame to be viewed in some quarters as the outcome of structural problems when repeated attempts at piecemeal reform failed to revive the economy. That something was basically wrong with the world's leading model of economic development had become grimly apparent. What was true ofJapan was also true elsewhere in Asia. On the same day that the facilitator was scribbling outdated descriptions of the Japanese miracle on her flip chart, the Seoul media were reporting the dramatic end to economic prosperity in South Korea, a country that had followed Japan in all particulars. Within a few weeks corporate insolvency quadrupled , the won fell to an all-time low, and the stock market was nearly shattered . A new government, elected to remedy the failed policies, began laying plans for across-the-board fiscal retrenchment mandated by the International Monetary Fund, which had barely rescued the nation from default. Amid the scramble to meet IMF guidelines, the only program to escape Seoul's budgetary ax was basic science and research.2 Although product R&D was being slashed, moneys allotted for pure science were kept in place, indicating the importance South Korea now attaches to this area. I have watched this trend toward greater science and technology (S&T) expenditures in Korea with much interest over the past few years. My curiosity was piqued by the fact that these new programs-hosting international research projects, funding local centers of excellence, targeting specific future technologies-are usually announced in paranoid terms that suggest Korea has gone as far as it can with imitation, needs to create new technology, and worries that it is unable. [18.218.184.214] Project MUSE (2024-04-17 20:58 GMT) Introduction 3 In Japan, too, there is widespread concern that the country lacks the creative skills needed to sustain growth into the twenty-first century. This is evidenced on the one hand by frantic moves to stimulate innovative research and apply new ideas to industrial production through decentralized research facilities,joint university-corporate R&D programs, and interdisciplinary collaboration, and on the other hand by frank admissions that Japan can no longer afford to take its research cues from the United States and Europe and must become "a scientifically and technologically creative nation" in its own right.3 To cite just one example, the Japan Science and Technology Corporation, a quasi-official scientific support body, reportedly shifted from product-oriented research to "cultivating the seeds of pioneering research" and "promoting creative exploratory research in basic fields" in response to this change in priorities.4 Still, there...