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Part 1 Moral Emotions of Self-Givenness This first part of Moral Emotions concerns the emotions of self-givenness. The main emotions of self-givenness that I focus on in this work are pride, shame, and guilt. I briefly touch on related and antithetical emotions in this part, such as embarrassment, self-love, being proud of, selfconfidence , modesty, remorse, and so on, primarily as a way of drawing distinctions. My focus, however, is on these three privileged experiences of self-givenness. I prefer the expression self-givenness to characterize these moral emotions rather than calling them, say, emotions of selfawareness , self-consciousness, self-appraisal, and the like for the following reasons. First, other figures—from Kant to Sartre—have shown that I am self-given in any experience in order to have an experience. Selfgivenness , for example, does not have to be occupied by higher-order acts of self-reflection or self-judgment in order for this self-givenness to take place. These experiences of pride, shame, and guilt are unique, first because I am given to myself explicitly in distinctive ways in the very experience, but second, also because they are emotional experiences in which self-givenness explicitly occurs. Second, the sense of self-givenness in these emotions has been approached by others dealing with the emotions under different rubrics. For example, Gabriele Taylor has referred to them as emotions of “selfassessment .” She does this because they concern certain beliefs in oneself in relation to social norms, where what is believed amounts to the assessment of the self.1 Teroni and Deonna,2 like Fischer and Tangney, among others, place these emotions (along with other emotions like envy, jealousy, embarrassment) in the context of the psychology of selfconscious emotions.3 Fischer and Tangney especially recognize the fundamental , inherent role of others in these emotions, maintaining that they are established through socially reciprocal evaluation and judgment . They argue in fact that these emotions have their own integrity, are not individualistic, though they are self-conscious, and that they testify to the fact that human behavior is fundamentally social. 28 M O R A L E M O T I O N S O F S E L F - G I V E N N E S S Rather than characterize pride, shame, and guilt within a psychology of “self-conscious” emotions, however, I describe them phenomenologically within a philosophical perspective. Further, they are treated not with respect to just any kind of individual or social behavior, or the means by which it is externally or internally sanctioned, but with regard to their moral significance.4 That is, they are treated not simply as human, but as personal or more precisely, interpersonal emotions, having fundamentally therefore a spiritual significance. They reveal the moral sense of the person in the dynamic process of becoming; they do not just disclose a psychological state. So, while these emotions do exhibit a cognitive dimension—a dimension widely recognized in contemporary literature, and a far, positive step from considering them as irrational5 —they themselves are not reducible to their epistemic functions. My experience of guilt, for example , is not reducible to my knowledge of guilt and what it can do in relation to the fear of punishment or to accommodating myself to others.6 In this case, it is not simply a matter of being self-aware through the emotions, though they do have this function. The awareness, however, is rooted in emotional tonalities and valences that bear on the becoming of the person. While self-consciousness can apply to any epistemic acquisition, even those that are specifically singularizing (like the examination of my conscience, theoretical speculation, etc.), pride, shame, and guilt also bear on ways in which I am not self-grounding, and hence as given to myself; they presuppose how I am given to Myself in the accusative, and thus self-given as in relation to another or others. There is indeed a possible critical dimension peculiar to shame and guilt. But this is prior to assessing myself, because the critical dimension that calls me into question (and is available for a subsequent assessment or adjudication) is spontaneous and in this sense pre-judicative. In pride, I am given to myself explicitly, but not in any critical manner that calls me into question, and certainly not in a manner of assessing myself. It presupposes my position in the world as the arbiter of meaning over the contributions of others and the world, and results...

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