In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

72 4 Contemporary Research in Psychology and Phenomenology The spirit and practice of the Sorbonne lectures is to engage with a wide range of contemporary research. Thus it is fitting not only to summarize Merleau-Ponty’s lectures, but also to consider them in the broader context of contemporary discussions about the relevance of child experience for our understanding of the human condition. In the previous chapter, we found that Merleau-Ponty argues that the objectification of the body through the mirror image initiates the distinct sense of self and other. This allows the infant to start to understand that she is observable to others. Prior to this stage, the infant lives in a state of syncretic sociability where she does not yet have the capacity to distinguish self from other or the ability to have a mental representation of herself. However, the large body of contemporary experimental research on neonatal imitation contradicts Merleau-Ponty’s depiction of young infants as being unable to imitate or even focus their gaze. This chapter will take up contemporary research in early childhood and a number of interpretations of it, paying particular attention to the arguments surrounding primary intersubjectivity. This experimental research has caused many to challenge ideas about the nature of early infancy. The majority of views argue that neonatal imitation demonstrates that instead of an early syncretic stage, we come to the world with a preliminary understanding of the difference between self and other. One interpretation that differs greatly from Merleau-Ponty’s syncretic sociability is that of the theory of mind. A theory of mind account argues that intersubjectivity is fundamentally cognitive. The degree to which an infant can be said to possess a primary intersubjectivity is the degree to which she has a “theory of mind.” A theory of mind is broadly used to describe our understanding of the mental states of others as mental states—that I know you have beliefs, attitudes, desires, and thoughts. My theory of mind will change during my development and my many varied experiences of others, but in order for me to appreciate the other person as another person, theory of mind accounts argue that I must have at least a preliminary “theory” about what mental states are like and that they are subjective. For phenomenologically minded thinkers, such a model appears to overintellectualize the infant and it is difficult 73 C O N T E M P O R A R Y R E S E A R C H I N P S Y C H O L O G Y A N D P H E N O M E N O L O G Y to reconcile with other experimental studies. The third section of this chapter will turn to contemporary researchers in phenomenology who take up the same experimental studies but draw different conclusions about the nature of intersubjectivity. They argue that primary intersubjectivity is not a mental operation of comparison or simulation, but an embodied experience. Gallagher’s (2005) “interaction theory” presents a view where intersubjectivity is only partially explained by theories of mind. Interactions with others are largely dominated by habit and environmental context. Stawarska’s (2009) “dialogical phenomenology” focuses upon the face-to-face communication that occurs between mother and child in infancy. She points out that phenomenology remains unable to explain the genesis of intersubjectivity with its traditional focus on first-person perspectives. Merleau-Ponty would have certainly had to revise his understanding of early infant perception and thus his characterization of early life. He would have likely taken up a similar path to Stawarska and Gallagher in searching for a truly interdisciplinary approach to intersubjectivity. Neonatal Imitation The research into our earliest experiences that has taken place in the half century since Merleau-Ponty’s death impressively presents us with a growing picture of just how much we are cognizant of ourselves, others, and the world. A baby lying in a crib, wiggling her arms and legs, might look distracted, unable to focus, and dominated by her internal desires, but instead we have found that even moments after birth, infants are capable of fairly complex interpersonal exchanges. This research, while ongoing and subject to significant debate regarding what developmental theory is needed to explain these findings, would seem to contradict many of Merleau-Ponty’s statements about the life of the infant. Studies in neonatal imitation have been used to claim that there is a very precocious, if not innate, ability for infants...

Share