Is Feminist Philosophy Philosophy?

13. The Very Idea of Feminist Epistemology

13 The Very Idea of Feminist Epistemology Lynn Hankinson Nelson The Limits of Analysis This essay attempts to redirect, among feminists representing a variety of philosophical traditions, a discussion of feminist epistemology and feminist philosophy ofscience.l I pursue two lines ofargument. The first is that critiques offeminist epistemology offered byfeminist theorists and mainstream epistemologists have relied on questionable views of both epistemology and feminist epistemology. The second line of argument builds on the first to advocate the view that epistemology is radically interdependent with other knowledge, undertakings, and interests-a viewI claim is commensuratewith epistemology's history and is promising for feminist theory. In the course ofthese arguments, three ironies emerge. One is that, their different motivations notwithstanding, it is on the basis of premises they share that manyfeminists and mainstream epistemologists have been led to the view that the very idea offeminist epistemology is incongruous. A second irony is that some of these shared premises are effectively undermined byfeminist analyses and critiques ofepistemolcgy. The third is that some of these premises are incommensurate with the standards their mainstream advocates claim to uphold. I begin by noting a fourth irony. The more interesting and vexing issues at the intersections of feminism, epistemology, and the philosophy of science will not be resolved by conceptual analysis alone. The 167 168 LYNN HANKINSON NELSON juxtapositions encompassed in the phrases "feminist epistemology" and "feministphilosophy ofscience," for example, which strike some feminist theorists and mainstream epistemologists as incongruous, strike others of us as only apparently incongruous and as roughly locating research agendas whose pursuit will help us become clearer about the nature of knowledge, ofscience, and oftheories about them.2 Thesejuxtapositions often signal the view that epistemology and the philosophy of science are not (and perhaps could not be) what some of their practitioners and advocates have wanted or claimed them to be-but also are not "dead," as some of their critics proclaim. In the end, the worth of research undertaken under these rubrics will be determined not by discussions such as this, but by criteria appropriate to judging any research program carrying substantial empirical content. Such criteria include whether the results achieved are commensurate with our experiences-including women's experiences-or, alternatively, point to more coherent reconstructions of these; and the contributions made to more viable accounts of knowledge and epistemic communities, and to better knowledge and epistemic practices.3 Although feminist scholarship provides sufficient warrant for forays into the nature of knowledge, science, and theories about them, final judgments ofthe significance ofthese forays are not yet possible. And itwould be less than forthright not to acknowledge that the impact of these forays will be determined in part by factors other than the criteriajust outlined. Claims to knowledge and about it constitute claims to cognitive authority, and these are political and socially mediated. Why, then, engage in the kind ofanalysis undertaken here? Because here, in the interim, we ask ourselves and are asked by our nonfeminist colleagues about the nature of the relationships among feminist analyses of knowledge, feminist politics, and epistemology and the philosophy of science "proper." Our answers, however qualified and tentative, have some bearing on how our work is received and on our own practices. Consider, for example, the recent call for papers for a special issue of The Monist devoted to the astonishing topic "Feminist EpistemologyFor and Against," which suggested that whether one is "for" or "against" "feminist epistemology" is a matter of subscribing to one of two clearly delineated, complete, and mutually exclusive sets of tenets.4 I contend that the call badly mischaracterized much ofthe work at the intersections offeminism, epistemology, and the philosophy of science. But I am also concerned that some of us working at these intersections have offered arguments which imply much the same.5 Our tentative answers to questions about the relationship between feminist analyses of knowledge and epistemology "proper" also shape 169 THE VERY IDEA OF FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY our evaluation of and openness to each other's approaches. Consider, for example, our apparent acceptance of the analytic/continental and other divides-an acceptance reflected in debates within feminist theory about the future of epistemology-and of the dismissiveness that has characterized debates "across" philosophical traditions.6 On one hand, this acceptance is curious. The efforts some of us have undertaken to create conceptual and empirical frameworks for investigating knowledge and theories about it have led us to draw...