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Toward a Wissenschaftslehre more geometrico (1800-1801)
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Toward a Wissenschaftslehre more geometrico (1800–1801) Daniel Breazeale On the “Development” of Fichte’s Philosophy and the Problematic “Unity of the Wissenschaftslehren” The issue of the development of Fichte’s philosophy—sometimes referred to as the problem of the “unity of the Wissenschaftslehren”—has long been central to Fichte studies. Even during his own lifetime, Fichte had to respond to charges—notably Schelling’s—that he had abandoned the standpoint of his early, Jena system for a radically different one.1 Though some excellent scholars—for example, Loewe, Fischer, Léon, and Wundt2 —have agreed with Fichte on this point, and have argued that the differences between the various presentations of the Wissenschaftslehre concern only the external “form” of a philosophical system the underlying principles and content of which remained unchanged from beginning to end, many others have been convinced that the striking differences of vocabulary and of presentation between, for example, the Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre of 1794–95, the Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre of 1801–2, and the Wissenschaftslehre of 1810, are indications of profound differences in the underlying contents of the same. These same interpreters , however, disagree among themselves concerning the precise number of significantly different “stages” or “periods” to assign to the development of the Wissenschaftslehre. Should one, for example, in the manner of Erdmann, Windelband, Medicus, Weischedel, Schmid, Heimsoeth, Janke, Rohs, and many others, simply distinguish between “earlier” and “later” Wissenschaftslehren, separated by an alleged “turn toward the absolute ”?3 Or should one, in the manner of Rickert, Lask, and Drechsler, also distinguish a “middle period”?4 Or should one make even finergrained distinctions within each of these two (or three) main periods,5 emphasizing the distinctive character of each of Fichte’s fifteen or so individual presentations of his philosophy?6 3 4 A F T E R J E N A Even among those who concede that there are substantial differences among at least some of Fichte’s presentations of his philosophy there is disagreement concerning the precise significance of these differences, with some concluding that they represent sharp breaks in the continuity of Fichte’s thinking and others arguing for the slow and continual “evolution ” of the Wissenschaftslehre from one presentation to the next. Interpreters of the former sort, of whom Gueroult is a good example, sometimes associate Fichte’s apparent shift from one standpoint to another with certain external events, such as the “Atheism Controversy,” or with the criticisms or initiatives of other philosophers, such as Jacobi or Schelling .7 In contrast, those who emphasize the continuity between the various Wissenschaftslehren usually interpret the differences between them as expressions of a certain immanent—“logical” or “dialectical”—development of Fichte’s own thinking, and thus they try to show how each successive version represents an effort on Fichte’s part to clarify issues left obscure in earlier versions and to solve new problems raised by his previous solutions to older ones. This is the course taken by, among others, Gurwitsch, Hartmann , Radrizzani, and Lauth.8 What most “evolutionary” approaches to the Wissenschaftslehre have in common is a tendency to view the later versions as the more “definitive” ones and thus to interpret the earlier ones in their light9 —which is, no doubt, how Fichte himself eventually came to view them. This, however, does not mean that we have to read these texts in this way. Indeed, one might well argue that the “spirit” of the various versions is so different that one does irreparable violence to the same when one uses, say, the second Wissenschaftslehre of 1804 for clues for interpreting the 1794–95 Grundlage —a point to which I shall return at the conclusion of my remarks. The scholarly debate over the relationship between the earlier and later Wissenschaftslehren has been complicated by several factors, including the incomplete and unsatisfactory state of the documentary evidence. Not only were many of the later manuscript versions of the Wissenschaftslehre unavailable to earlier scholars, but those that were available were often published in incomplete and defectively edited form. Another complicating factor is a tendency to confuse questions concerning the internal, systematic development of the Wissenschaftslehre with biographical issues concerning external, often highly dramatic, changes in Fichte’s external circumstances and career. Dazzled by the visibility and drama of many of these biographical events, some scholars have felt an almost irresistible temptation to employ Fichte’s biography as the key to his philosophy. Though it would be absurd to suggest that the dramatic changes in...