Phenomenology and the Problem of History: A Study of Husserl's Transcendental Philosophy

11. The Project of Transcendental Philosophy

II/The Project of Transcendental Philosophy THE CONSIDERATIONS of the last chapter have led us to question the idea of historical skepticism. It should be made clear that we questioned it as a coherent philosophical position; that is, we were able to subject it to criticism only by supposing that its proponents were willing to put forward the reasons for maintaining it. Naturally, this is the only way that this or any other form of skepticism, or indeed any philosophical position at all, can be subjected to criticism. If the doctrine is held merely as a matter of unsubstantiated belief, there is nothing that can be said against it. This puts the skeptic in the position of a dogmatist, of course, a position he may find uncomfortable. In any case, our criticism took this form: that the historicist position could only be supported by appeals to a theory of consciousness which is not itself subject to the major stricture of historicism. Only by asserting that consciousness is essentially -and thus ahistorically-characterized by historicity can the historicist give any substance to his view. We went on to point out that if the historicist is willing to concede this much, but wishes to argue for skepticism with respect to everything elsenotably a transcendental theory of world structure-he must face the fact that his theory of consciousness itself has certain implications for the structure of the world and that even this argument for skepticism seems to take that notion of structure for granted. We suggested at the end of the last chapter that these difficulties in the historicist position might lead us to go back and question the train of thought that led up to it. That train of [260] The Project ofTranscendental Philosophy / 261 thought was presented primarily in our interpretation of the Introduction to Experience and Judgment and focused on the manner in which historical prejudices were said to effect the way we experience things. That interpretation culminated in what we called the rejection of reflection as the basis of transcendental -philosophical assertions. Are we now, because of the considerations of the last chapter, in a position to declare that interpretation invalid and to reaffirm the status of reflection which is at the heart of transcendental philosophy? After all, if the skeptic, daunted by our critique and in full retreat, claims the validity of his historical view of consciousness, does he not do so precisely on the basis of reflection, at least in part? Does not any theory of consciousness resort ultimately to the reflections of the theorist upon his own conscious life? Are we not in a position, now, simply to blot from the record the exaggerations of Experience and Judgment and return to the practice of the phenomenological version of transcendental philosophy? REFLECTION AND HISTORICAL REDUCTION WE WOULD BE MISTAKEN if we thought that the considerations of the last chapter established this much. The fact is that these considerations contribute nothing themselves to the support of any putative transcendental philosophy. Nor, strictly speaking, do they establish even the pOSSibility, in principle, of such a philosophy. All they really show is how difficult it is to deny such a possibility in any definitive way. Or, more precisely, they show that even any attempt to deny it presupposes to some extent the very possibility that is being denied. Clearly, much more is needed if the validity of the transcendental project-at least in Husserl's terms-is to be reestablished . In particular, the topic of reflection must be reexamined, and it must be shown that reflection is capable of more than a mirroring of the historical-cultural prejudices of the philosopher who happens to be reflecting. And this in turn depends on a final refutation of the thesis that historical-cultural prejudices not only affect the way we think about and interpret the world of our experience, but also transform that very world by shaping the way in which it is given in direct experience. We touched upon this topic in the last chapter, but again 262 / P HEN 0 MEN 0 LOG Y AND HIS TOR Y our attacks on this thesis are not sufficient to establish in any definitive way the possibility of a reflective transcendental philosophy. All we were able to do was to cast doubt on the soundness of this thesis by showing that it, in turn, is not substantiated. We pointed out...