Reexamining Socrates in the Apology

9. The (Childish) Nature of the Soul in Plato’s Apology

191 9 The (Childish) Nature of the Soul in Plato’s Apology John Russon Upon a first reading, it may seem that Socrates in the Apology is an enemy of collective prejudice and a champion of individual thinking. More careful reading, however, reveals a more complex situation; in particular, it reveals a more complex relationship to collective prejudice. Who are Socrates’ Accusers? Socrates and the Old Charges One of the first concerns to which Socrates turns in his defense speech is the “old charges” to which he believes he is being made answerable. These old charges—“making the weaker argument the stronger” and “investigating things in the heavens and under the ground” (18b)—are what we have come to expect as the typical prejudices against intellectuals in general and perhaps philosophers in particular.1 Both of these charges are accusations that one is stepping outside one’s limits, taking an investigation (the mind) into an improper area or using the power of language to produce improper results. These accusations, Socrates claims, are culturally held prejudices—then and always—and it is this phenomenon of a collective prejudice that Socrates thinks it necessary to identify if he is to make his defense of philosophy, which is equally his defense of himself. This challenge to prejudice is often taken as the most distinctive character of Socrates’ discourse, essential to his mission of realizing an examined life by examining his own life and cross-examining others. Throughout all the dialogues it is clear that Socrates is concerned to determine whether or not his interlocutors have sufficient foundation for their beliefs or whether, on the contrary, their beliefs are simply prejudice , and the unearthing of and removal of such prejudice seems his 192 T H E ( C H I L D I S H ) N A T U R E O F T H E S O U L central pursuit. In the Apology, the relevant prejudicial beliefs are those held about himself, and they are particularly pernicious, partly because they challenge the worth of his person and also the most worthy of human endeavors (the very endeavor of challenging prejudice), and partly because of the destructive way in which they are spread and nurtured: essentially , through gossip. These observations, it seems to me, are all true as far as they go, but they fail to notice one distinctive feature that, I believe , already introduces a major innovation in ontology and epistemology , hardly noticed for the next two thousand years. Whereas in the other dialogues, Socrates deals with the specific prejudices held by particular individuals, here the subject of these prejudices is not an individual. We must ask “Who are Socrates’ accusers?” and by so doing we are led into an important new conception of the “who” of human identity in general.2 In his discussion of the “old charges,” Socrates has identified the reality of an anonymous collective identity, one that accuses, and one that structures the thinking and behavior—the identities—of the persons who make up a society. Athens—the city—is not just a collection of individuals (as Hobbes believes), but it is also not just a systematic social whole (as Aristotle believes): it is also a “sleeping horse” (30e), that is to say, through the acts of individuals and through the carrying out of political life something further is being enacted, and that is something like the “sluggish” movements of “a great and well-bred” animal.3 This animal cannot easily be identified: it is the anonymous atmosphere of interpretation and belief that provides the cultural context into which members of the society are born: “They got hold of many of you from childhood, and they accused me and persuaded you” (18b); “They spoke to you at the age when you were most trusting, when some of you were children and youths” (18c); “And the most unreasonable thing of all is that it is not even possible to know and to say their names” (18c). Who were they, who spoke? It is not possible to say. Is this simply because Socrates lacked modern techniques of surveillance? No: it is because the passing on of such accusations is not the deed of specific individuals, but is rather the generalized spread of gossip that structures social interaction. “How you, men of Athens, have been affected by my accusers, I do not know” (17a). This is how Socrates begins his speech. In part, he is referring to the accusers at his trial...