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§18 Trieb und Instinkt—A Unique Contribution of Psychoanalysis The word “drive” does not appear in the English translation of Freud’s Gesammelten Werken. Instead, “instinct” is used in its place. As numerous commentators have noted, Freud employs Trieb, and not Instinkt, to designate the psychoanalytic theory of those forces molding the motivations of the psychical apparatus. Is this really so important? Is Strachey’s translation that objectionable? If so, what is at stake in distinguishing drive from instinct? Lacan adamantly insists that Freud’s thought remains unintelligible so long as one fails to recognize the difference between Trieb and Instinkt.1 He stringently denies that psychoanalysis has anything whatsoever to do with instincts—“the unconscious as instinct . . . has nothing to do with the Freudian unconscious . . . have you ever, for a single moment, the feeling that you are handling the clay of instinct?” (SXI, 126). Elsewhere, Lacan states that, “the drive—the Freudian drive—has nothing to do with instinct (none of Freud’s expressions allows for confusion)” (Lacan 1996, 417). To properly evaluate a position such as Lacan’s, some preliminary remarks are necessary on the psychoanalytic conception of the instinct–drive distinction . Lacan is correct that rendering Trieb as “instinct” is a regrettable error in the translation of Freud. However, the complete denial of all features pertaining to instinct (and here Lacan has the biological notion of instinct in mind) as having a role in the Freudian unconscious might be too extreme, too sweeping. In fact, Lacan’s own definition of “need”—as part of the need–demand–desire triad—preserves a decisively biological, physicomaterial dimension in analytic theory (see §23). Perhaps the best way to set about outlining the rudiments of the The Unfolding of the Freudian Drive 156 6 instinct–drive distinction is to begin with the definition of instinct. This brief exposition of instinct limits itself to being a presentation of how instinct is portrayed by psychoanalysis, that is, as a foil for drive. Given the vastness of the topic itself—the historical career of the notion of instinct as well as the volume of literature generated in various fields apropos this notion is mind boggling—no concise summary of the notion of instinct can claim to be satisfactory. Nonetheless, since the main concern of this project is reshaping the conception of drive in the Freudian field, a cursory sketch of instinct in contradistinction from drive must suffice. Psychoanalysis is not biology pursued by other means. Although Freud sometimes expresses a yearning for biological confirmations of his analytic theories,2 he nonetheless resists the temptation to make the psychical apparatus ultimately answerable to the anatomical, chemical, or neurological workings of the body. Biological confirmation functions in a messianic capacity for Freud—in a future yet-to-come, science will vindicate the findings of analytic investigation. Thus, instinct, to the extent that it implies the dominance of innate physical programs ruling the individual human organism, cannot serve as the foundation of Freud’s extant explanation of the unconscious forces dominating mental life. Specifically, the biological conception of instinct displays four facets pertinent to its distinction from Trieb—a genetic inherency, a self-preservative character, an invariability of goal, and an automaticity of functional enactment. First, instincts are behavioral patterns universally manifested in all members of a given species. In other words, they are genetically hardwired for each and every organism of a given type. As such, the only level at which instincts are historicized to any degree might be the macro-scale chronology of evolutionary time (in Freudian parlance, a “physical phylogenetic heritage”). In general, though, instincts are remarkably resistant to historicization—specifically, contextual modification at the ontogenetic level. In fact, in order for them to function in an efficient and proper manner, they must not rely on the contingencies of the individual organism ’s singular lived history. If instincts had to take shape through the defiles of each organism’s idiosyncratic set of experiences, then nature would be sending living beings out into a world in which they do not automatically “know” how to survive. But, large amounts of observational data contradict this possibility; most organisms seemingly enter the world with a minimum savoir faire aiding their struggle for survival. In Lacanian parlance, the notion of instinct entails the idea of a sort of preexistent, readymade “knowledge in the Real.”3 Second, instincts are usually interpreted as serving the interests of the individual and/or the species to which this individual belongs. Automatic responses like...

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