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16 The Poetic Weight of the Body
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289 The best . . . would perhaps be . . . to learn to read Freud the way we read a classic, that is, by understanding his words and theoretical concepts, not in their lexical and common meaning, but in the meaning they acquire from within the experience which they announce and of which we have behind our backs more than a suspicion . . . perhaps we should continue calling it the unconscious—so long as we do not forget that the word is the index of an enigma—because the term retains, like the algae or the stone that one drags up, something of the sea from which it was taken. —Merleau-Ponty Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s reaction to Freudian psychoanalysis was quite different than the existential phenomenologists discussed in previous chapters. In general, he was far more receptive to Freudian theoretical insights , even though he sought to reposture them in what he believed was the philosophically more viable context of an existential phenomenological framework.1 This raises some very interesting questions: what, in the end, is the relationship of the goals of existential phenomenology to Freudian psychoanalysis? To some, there never seemed to be a natural meeting ground between the world of consciousness and the world of the unconscious , while to others, existential phenomenology and Freudian psychoanalysis appear to be entirely consistent. Are the goals of the two essentially identical, compatible, or possibly mutually exclusive? Do they converge, and if so, to what extent? Is there a convergence, which results in their merger? To what extent is a reconciliation between the two possible? This chapter will address these questions from Merleau-Ponty’s point of view. We shall do this while examining Merleau-Ponty’s attitude The Poetic Weight of the Body: Merleau-Ponty’s Reposturing of Freudian Psychoanalysis 16 toward Freudian psychoanalysis as it evolved throughout the course of his philosophical development; and considering what Freud’s reaction to Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation/reposturing of his thought would have been. Merleau-Ponty’s major and original contributions toward an understanding of the relationship existing between existential phenomenology and Freudian psychoanalysis will be “fleshed” out while some of the deficiencies and unresolved problems involved in his suggestions will be noted. Merleau-Ponty’s Attitude toward Freudian Psychoanalysis In his first book, The Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty engaged in a strong critique of objectivist psychology. Here, Merleau-Ponty believed that one of his essential tasks was to disclose “the abuse of causal thinking in explanatory theories,” while showing how one might properly conceive that which is of value in them.2 Merleau-Ponty felt that by focusing upon the Freudian psychoanalytic system as his example, he could effectively accomplish both. It was his belief that it is beneficial to glean what is of value in Freudian psychoanalysis and resituate it within an existential phenomenological framework. Merleau-Ponty first alluded to the characteristic objectivist phraseology of the Freudian system. Freud, in his discussions and descriptions of the psychological mechanisms (the formation of complexes, repression, and so on), had written in such a way as to suggest a psychical content of unconscious forces and entities. Freud, in fact, has been traditionally interpreted in just this way. Without questioning Freud’s account of the libidinal infrastructure, Merleau-Ponty wanted to inquire as to whether or not those actual conflicts and psychological mechanisms of which Freud had spoken, necessarily required the system of causal notions by which he had interpreted them. Merleau-Ponty’s answer was that such causal thinking was dispensable. He contended that what was important in Freud’s theory could just as easily be shown through the use of nonobjectivist language . In a highly significant passage, Merleau-Ponty wrote: Development should be considered, not as the fixation of a given force on outside objects which are also given, but as a progressive and discontinuous structuration of behavior. Normal structuration is one which reorganizes conduct in depth in such a way that infantile attitudes no longer have a place or meaning in the new attitude; it would result in perfectly 290 A P P R E H E N D I N G T H E I N A C C E S S I B L E [54.84.65.73] Project MUSE (2024-03-19 14:13 GMT) integrated behavior, each moment of which would be internally linked with the whole. One will say that there is repression when integration has been achieved only in appearance and leaves certain relatively isolated systems subsisting in behavior...