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14 “The Science That Never Was”
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242 14 Strictly speaking, there are only two sciences; psychology . . . and natural science. —Freud Quite frankly, I do not believe in the existence of psychology. I have not done it, and I do not believe it exists. —Sartre Sartre’s criticisms of Freudian metapsychology were extensive and complex , reflecting at times his deep-seated ambivalence. Even very early on, Sartre seemed genuinely to appreciate psychoanalysis’s serious acknowledgment that there was more to being human than surface appearances. Psychoanalysis’s recognition that there are deeper meanings and interpretations to human activity, that everything in human activity is meaningful , that we are mysterious even to ourselves, and so on, were tremendous insights and could contribute toward a fuller human understanding. Yet the instrument used in an attempt to uncover these mysteries—namely, the instrument of science—as Sartre perceived it, was seriously flawed. Insofar as Freud was a scientist and made use of scientific explanations, psychoanalysis suffered. Due to the complexity of Sartre’s criticisms, the following critique is organized into four major sections within which more specific criticisms are developed. This has the added benefit of allowing “Freud” to respond to each major criticism without losing contact with the specific arguments .1 In general, Sartre accused Freud (1) of uncritically adopting science as providing an explanation for human nature, while (a) holding two incompatible scientific explanations (mechanistic and finalistic) which conflated causality and purpose, (b) misunderstanding the distinc- “The Science That Never Was”: Sartre’s Critique of Freudian Metapsychology tion between “explanation” and “comprehension” (understanding) and purporting to offer the former by reifying and dissecting consciousness, and (c) losing sight of the individual within the universal; (2) of misapplying the scientific method to the self, thereby (a) misrepresenting the self as a thing, (b) splitting the “thing” that was self into a subject and object , (c) consequently failing to account for the emergence of meaning, and (d) falsely presenting humans as causally determined; (3) of sacrificing human freedom and thus robbing humans of what is intrinsic to their being—freedom, creativity, anguish, temporality, and moral responsibility ; and (4) of splitting up consciousness and developing the notion of an unconscious, exemplifying all of Freud’s fundamental mistakes. This final point will be taken up in the next chapter. The Misapplication of Scientific Explanation Sartre accused Freud of having assumed that scientific reflection and observation were the only true sources of knowledge. Hence the mind was considered an object for scientific research just like anything else.2 This was the attitude and approach toward human beings which most offended Sartre. Even with his “softening” toward Freudian psychoanalysis later in life, Sartre never came to the point of embracing the practice of applying scientific methodology to human beings. “Quite frankly,” he said in a 1972 interview, “I do not believe in the existence of psychology.”3 Typical of Sartre’s humor, he boldly conveyed his total rejection of psychology as a science (that is, as anything other than mere psychobiography). This was not only because psychology treated humans as objects to be investigated and was therefore fundamentally misguided from the start, but because of the nature of the theory of explanation it presupposed. Freud’s Presupposed Theories of Explanation as Incompatible According to Sartre, Freud’s adoption of the scientific perspective presupposed a mechanistic account of human nature whereby humans were understood to be rigidly subject to the principle of cause and effect (Freud’s determinism). Within this framework, however, Sartre contended that Freud could not account for his notions of, for example, “repression” and “resistance.” For to say that a person is caused to do x is not the same as to say that a person purposively does x. One must have a purpose in order for repression and resistance to be possible at all. In other words, Sartre 243 “ T H E S C I E N C E T H A T N E V E R W A S ” [54.166.234.171] Project MUSE (2024-03-19 02:27 GMT) believed that one must have an “intent” or “meaning” in order to engage in Freud’s repression or resistance. Hence, Sartre believed that Freud was forced to go beyond this purely mechanistic account to incorporate a “finalistic ” or teleological account of human nature.4 Sartre must have had in mind Freud’s statement: The individual does actually carry on a twofold existence: one to serve his own purposes and the other as a link in a chain, which...