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12 The Unspoken Dialogue
- Northwestern University Press
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211 Science is never able to critique philosophy because it is founded upon philosophy itself. —Heidegger Philosophy is not opposed to science, it behaves like a science and works in part by the same methods; it departs from it, however, by clinging to the illusion of being able to present a picture of the universe which is without gaps and is coherent, though one which is bound to collapse with every fresh advance in our knowledge. —Freud As seen in the previous chapter, Heidegger was severely critical of Freudian psychoanalysis and its tacit ontology. Heidegger was convinced that Freud’s uncritical adoption of the scientific Weltanschauung of his time prevented him from seeing what was ontologically significant. In the Zollikon Seminars, Heidegger also critiqued Freud’s underlying philosophical presuppositions and specific elements within Freud’s metapsychological theory. Although not systematic, and somewhat disorganized, Heidegger’s critique of Freud was reasonably complete. It is also the case that Freud would not have been without any resources to respond; indeed, he would have had important rejoinders to many of Heidegger’s objections. Certainly , during Freud’s own lifetime and within his own circle of colleagues, he found himself frequently having to defend his position and justify his decision to go beyond the strict bounds of science. As discussed in earlier chapters, Freud ardently desired the respect of his fellow scientists, yet his experience in therapy showed him the limits of remaining within his scientific framework. Thus, he was compelled to go beyond scientific The Unspoken Dialogue: Heidegger’s Specific Criticisms of Freudian Psychoanalysis 12 methodology to apply a regressive archaeological methodology, which synthesized a great deal of previous historical philosophical systems. Heidegger considered Freud’s psychoanalysis strictly within the confines of scientific discovery, nonetheless, and hence Heidegger believed Freud to have ultimately failed both as a scientist and as one who purports to offer an accurate description of human existence. This chapter is divided into two basic sections. The first section looks further at how Heidegger thought scientism affected Freud’s most fundamental assumptions—as Heidegger understood them—and how scientistic thinking underlies and was intrinsic to various elements of Freud’s theory. Heidegger’s criticisms are organized so as to enhance their coherent flow. The second section of this chapter ponders the question: How would Freud have responded to Heidegger’s criticisms? Obviously Freud would not have agreed with Heidegger’s analysis of his metapsychological theory; and although Freud was not alive to hear what Heidegger had to say, Freud’s writings give a fairly clear view of what his position was. This section provides “Freud” the opportunity to express that position in the face of Heidegger’s critique. Heidegger’s Criticisms of Freud’s Philosophical Presuppositions Given Heidegger’s critique of Freud’s worldview, and Heidegger’s alternative perspective, it is now important to consider with greater specificity what Heidegger thought about some of Freud’s fundamental assumptions. Again, Heidegger’s overall goal in discussing these during his Zollikon Seminars was to break the hold of the dictatorship of scientific thinking and its concomitant, tacit ontology, by conducting a critical reflection upon some of the most basic, interrelated philosophical presuppositions of Freud’s metapsychological theory. Heidegger argued that Freud made certain fundamental assumptions with regard to the nature and function of physical and psychical processes . Freud assumed that both the physical and psychical domains operated in the same mechanical way;1 that they were ultimately grounded in somatic processes (forces);2 and that psychical processes were transformable into somatic ones and vice versa. As a result, Freud considered both the physical and psychical as a continuous nexus of causal relations.3 Such a view already presupposed that all human activity was necessarily subjectable to reductionistic, scientistic analysis,4 in which everything that exists is measurable.5 Hence, Freud postulated the complete explainabil212 A P P R E H E N D I N G T H E I N A C C E S S I B L E [3.236.18.23] Project MUSE (2024-03-19 11:49 GMT) ity of psychical life6 in causal terms.7 However, since no “uninterrupted explainability ” appeared in consciousness, Heidegger pointed out that Freud found it necessary to “invent the unconscious,”8 and introduce the “fatal distinction” between the conscious and the unconscious;9 to resort to the hypothesis of “unconscious purposes” as explanations;10 and to mistakenly construct the idea of “unconscious motivation,”11 thereby conflating “cause” and “motive.”12 To...