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Introduction Reconsidering Transcendental Phenomenology T he theme of this book is the space of meaning and the path opened up to its philosophical elucidation by Husserl and Heidegger. The space of meaning is familiar to philosophers under many names, reflecting diverse views of what is most important about it. Recently, Wilfred Sellars’s name for it—the “space of reasons”—has come into vogue, signaling an interest in distinguishing between explanations that also provide justifications (reasons) and those that do not (causes). Earlier it was common to talk in Wittgensteinian terms of “logical space” in which individual phenomena (or sentences) had their “place.” Earlier still, neoKantian philosophers spoke of the Geltungsbereich, or “realm of validity,” to distinguish the specific theme of philosophy from that of the empirical sciences of nature or the historical sciences. In the tradition that informs the approach taken in the present volume, the space of meaning has also been identified in various ways. Early Husserl (followed by the earliest Heidegger) called it the field of “phenomenological immanence.” Later, he would rechristen it “transcendental consciousness,” while Heidegger preferred simply to speak of “world.” A philosophical topos capable of being approached under so many designations will not be surveyable in a single pass. Indeed, as the messianic faith in something called the “linguistic turn” shows every sign of having receded in late-twentiethcentury philosophy, it becomes possible to recognize that what has distinguished philosophy in the twentieth century is not that it has concerned itself with language, but that, whether through the prism of language or not, it has concerned itself with meaning. The present volume aims to contribute something to this ongoing inquiry. Specifically, it argues that transcendental phenomenology is indispensable to the philosophical elucidation of the space of meaning. No doubt this argument flouts the spirit of the times—whether measured in “analytic” or “continental” terms—and this along two axes. 3 4 H U S S E R L , H E I D E G G E R , A N D T H E S P A C E O F M E A N I N G First, in spite of important work by Mohanty, Sokolowski, and others, transcendental phenomenology is still too often simply dismissed as a relic, as “Cartesian,” “foundationalist,” “idealist”—all terms of deepest opprobrium in contemporary philosophy. But Husserl’s thought has not been well understood, because it has not been read, by most of those who criticize it. And among those who are well positioned to understand it, that philosophy has long been held hostage to animosities stemming from the collapse of the personal relationship between Husserl and Heidegger. For too long the philosophical significance of phenomenology has been hostage to the clannish behavior of phenomenologists such that the only possible conjunction between Husserl and Heidegger appears to be an either/or. Which brings me to the second axis: Among students of Husserl and Heidegger, it will likely seem perverse to identify as “transcendental phenomenology” Heidegger’s contribution to an elucidation of the space of meaning. Heidegger takes center stage in this book, but it is a Heidegger whose philosophical relevance depends largely on our being able to recollect the Husserlian infrastructure of his work and to carry out new constitutional analyses within the framework Heidegger provides. Thus, I claim that his decisive contribution remains within the horizon of transcendental phenomenology and does not lie in some sort of hermeneutic, pragmatic, or postmodern “break” with that horizon. Such a claim obviously requires much defense, some of which can be found in the chapters that follow. These take up the challenge of suggesting not only how a successful philosophical grasp of the space of meaning demands transcendental phenomenology, but also how the HusserlHeidegger relation can be understood so as to make the distinctive contributions of each accessible within that ongoing phenomenological project.1 In carrying out this task, an interpretation of the early Heidegger— the one who is still on the way to Being and Time—proves crucial. Parts 1 and 2 of this book reflect this in different ways. Part 1 concerns the tradition of transcendental logic as developed in neo-Kantianism (especially by the most original member of the Baden school, Emil Lask) and as appropriated by Heidegger during his student years at Freiburg. Focus on Lask and the issue of transcendental logic achieves two things. First, it becomes clear how third-generation neo-Kantians like Lask, whose work was deeply...

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