In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

SECTION VII Discussion of the Good 1. The Good as Ideal and as Standard Lecture XIX. February 25,1901 IT IS PRACTICALLY impossible to separate the good as ideal and the good as standard from each other. Theoretically I think it is desirable . But questions are apt to arise at once ofthe nature ofthe standard of morality and of the nature of the ideal of action. What I started out to discuss in the previous lecture was simply the question of the good as projected, as aimed in action. And the point made was that the good is that which satisfies desire. That is to be interpreted in the light of what had been said before of the relation of the desire to self: that the desire is not a thing by itself but is the continued assertion ofactivity onl the selfin a given direction. Certain fundamental instincts, wants and appetities are always asserting themselves . And to a certain extent they must be satisfied, must reach satisfaction, or life itself cannot go on. Take two fundamental types of such wants: the appetite for food and the sex appetite. It is quite clear that on the whole those instincts must succeed in satisfying themselves or else the life ofthe race and ofthe individual ceases. The satisfaction at first is an accomplished result; these instincts are part of the life process. Life asserts itself through them and if life goes on they must be satisfied. And that only means that they must reach expression. That is a statement ofwhat actually happens rather than a statement directly of any moral or even psychological significance. The point is that under certain circumstances, brought out in the analysis ofdesire, that satisfaction of the instinct, or appetite, or want, is anticipated. It 1. This is not to say that the activity that asserts itself is outside the self; it is a functioning aspect of the self. 184 Psychology of Ethics 185 is presented to consciousness before it takes place as a fact. When present to consciousness or ideally present, it is a partial, inchoate satifaction; and there is dissatisfaction, uneasiness, excitement. Moreover , that anticipation ofsatisfaction tends to stimulate and keep alive the active tendency as well as to use its intellectual content (the image proper) to steady and direct the desire, give it a definite object towards which to direct itself instead of its going more or less blindly and aimlessly. If that be true it must follow that a good is simply that which is satisfied in one of these fundamental desires or wants. Or perhaps I should not put in the word 'fundamental', even in speaking of a good. Anything, so far as it does satisfy any ofthese tendencies, is good. The good, if there be such a thing, must be simply a name of a systematic, unified, harmonized satisfaction of the self, that is to say of the agent in and through all ofthese, not taken collectively but taken systematically , as products of the whole or unity. There may be plenty ofdifficulties in working that out on the ethical side. But the fundamental question is whether the previous analysis has been correct or not. Ifthat is not correct there is intrinsic, scientific reason for doubting this conclusion. But ifthe previous analysis of the instinctive activity and the relation ofdesire to that is correct, it would seem an unavoidable conclusion that the nature of the good, that for which we are striving and that which will meet our strivings, must be of the nature indicated. We either have to say, then, that that has no ethical relevancy at all, that the ethical result must be reached on another basis and from another method; or else we must make our ethical theory, whatever it is, square with the results ofthe psychological analysis. There are two alternatives: the one basing ethical theory on psychological analysis and the other saying that, really, psychological analysis has no relevance to the ethical theory, that when it comes to an ethical theory ofthe good (the good as ethical) you have to ignore the whole psychological standpoint and find some other method upon which to define the good. The statement that there is a criterion of the good planted in us distinct from the other [or psychological] thing, and that you use that to judge ofthe satisfaction, would simply be saying that you must take the other alternative. Namely, that you must have an independent method, perfectly distinct from the psychological...

Share