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5 Opportunely Delivered Fire The seeds of the Manassas campaign were sown on 26 June 1862, even before the fighting around Richmond had reached its conclusion, when Maj. Gen. John Pope gained command of the newly organized Army of Virginia. This army, 51,000 men strong, consisted of remnants of the forces Stonewall Jackson had earlier defeated in the Shenandoah Valley. Its task was to move against Gordonsville and Charlottesville to disrupt the Confederacy’s link to the Shenandoah Valley along the Virginia Central Railroad. The army soon advanced to the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers in a line extending from Fredericksburg west to Culpeper Court House and Sperryville. So began the events that over the following weeks would elevate Chapman’s Dixie Artillery to the heights of success yet in the end bring the disbanding of his battery and loss of command.1 The strategic situation in July did not favor the Confederate army around Richmond. McClellan’s Army of the Potomac still threatened the capital from its base on the James River, and Pope readied his Army of Virginia to advance south. To counter this threat while still defending Richmond, Lee sent 14,000 men to Gordonsville under the command of Jackson. Without sufficient numbers to attack, Jackson settled into a wary watch. A. P. Hill’s division later joined Jackson, but still Jackson waited for his opportunity to strike. That came on 6 August, when Pope began moving his army on Culpeper. Pope’s troop movements left the army scattered, and Jackson found his opportunity at Cedar Mountain, eight miles south of Culpeper. There, on the ninth, he engaged the Federals, but though Jackson held the field, the position was not secure, and the Confederates fell back across the Rapidan River to Gordonsville two days later. By that time, Lee had discerned that McClellan no longer threatened Richmond and was in fact abandoning his position on the James River. It was John Mosby who secured evidence of this movement and brought it to Lee’s attention. Lee left a minimal force around Richmond and moved the remainder of the army to Gordonsville.2 The end of July found the Dixie Artillery still attached to Longstreet’s division . Together, the Dixie and the Washington batteries formed the artillery reserve. Yet as the men prepared for the march to Gordonsville, they suffered  opportunely delivered fire  from losses in the ranks—a persistent trend that would ultimately lead to disbandment . Three men had been lost from service at Glendale, 1 man transferred, 4 men were medically discharged, and 1 man died of chronic diarrhea.3 Walton’s command prepared to leave camp on Saturday, 9 August, and began the march late Sunday afternoon. Unlike their brethren in the infantry, who enjoyed a quick passage to Gordonsville by train, the artillerymen labored under a difficult march, covering some 70 miles in the oppressive heat and humidity of central Virginia in August. Temperatures in excess of 90°F restricted marching to early morning and evening. Midday relief was sought in whatever shade could be found. The artillerists reached Louisa Court House Tuesday evening and Gordonsville Wednesday morning. The next day, the fourteenth, they set up camp 3 miles from Gordonsville. There, the weary men rested, but their respite was brief.4 The fifteenth of August found Lee, Jackson, and Longstreet at Gordonsville planning strategy. Jackson commanded the left wing of the army, 24,000 men organized into three divisions. Longstreet commanded the right wing, 30,000 men organized into five divisions. The commanders knew that if they had any hope of victory they must quickly defeat Pope’s army before McClellan’s arrived. Pope’s Army of Virginia was situated between the Rapidan and Rappahannock Rivers. The latter river presented a formidable barrier. The Confederates could gain a decisive victory by blocking the river crossings and pinning the Federals along the Rappahannock. Lee set the attack for three days later, 18 August.5 Longstreet’s command had grown considerably from his old division of six brigades. In this campaign, he commanded fifteen brigades. Richard Anderson, who had led the division during the Seven Days’ battles, now held the rank of major general and led a division of three brigades. Brig. Gen. John Hood led a second division of two brigades—his Texas brigade and Col. Evander Law’s brigade. Four other brigades had joined the command—three organized into a division led by Brig. Gen. David Jones; the fourth, an...

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