The Chickamauga Campaign

1. In the Shadow of the Rock: Thomas L. Crittenden, Alexander M. McCook, and the 1863 Campaigns for Middle and East Tennessee

5  in the shadow of the rock thomas l. crittenden, alexander m. mccook, and the 1863 campaigns for middle and east tennessee Ethan S. Rafuse In histories of the great campaign that culminated in the September 1863 Battle of Chickamauga, discussion of the role the Army of the Cumberland ’s corps commanders played in shaping its course and outcome has understandably been dominated by the performance of Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas. From the time Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans assumed command in October 1862 of what eventually became known as the Army of the Cumberland , he relied heavily on Thomas’s counsel, which played a significant role in whatever successes Rosecrans achieved in his efforts to organize and manage that army. This was at no time more the case than in the operations and brutal fighting that took place in the late summer of 1863 at Chickamauga. At that battle, on September 19 and 20, Thomas found himself in charge of the critical task of thwarting Confederate efforts to crush the Union left and set the stage for the destruction of the Army of the Cumberland by cutting it off from Chattanooga. Thomas won the immortal nickname, “The Rock of Chickamauga,” by taking the magnificent stand that contained the damage inflicted by a dramatic Confederate breakthrough on September 20, which crushed the center of the Union line and sent it and the entire right of the army fleeing to Chattanooga. Thomas’s strong performances throughout Rosecrans’s tenure in command of the Army of the Cumberland are familiar to even casual students of the Civil War. Less well known because of the attention Thomas’s efforts have received from historians are the roles played by the Army of the Cumberland ’s other two principal corps commanders, Maj. Gen. Alexander McCook and Maj. Gen. Thomas Crittenden. Indeed, McCook and Crittenden, :RRGZRUWK&KLQGG $0 ethan s. rafuse 6 both of whom ensured a dark cloud would hang over their reputations after abandoning the field of battle at Chickamauga while Thomas made his stand on Snodgrass Hill and Horseshoe Ridge, when not ignored altogether, have usually been offered up as men whose shortcomings help us to better appreciate the greatness of Thomas’s character and generalship. This essay brings McCook and Crittenden out of the large shadow Thomas casts over the history of the Army of the Cumberland by reexamining their performances in the Chickamauga campaign. This is not to make a case either for or against them and certainly not to portray them as misunderstood masters of the military art. However, given the low regard in which McCook and Crittenden have generally been held by historians and the heavy pall the events at Chickamauga cast over them, it is difficult to take a balanced approach to these historical subjects without appearing to be engaged in special pleading on their behalf. Whether or not readers finish this essay believing that has been avoided, at the least they may find information and gain insight that will give them a better understanding of these officers, the history of the Army of the Cumberland in general, and the Chickamauga campaign in particular. The forces Rosecrans inherited from Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell when the Lincoln administration deemed Buell’s conduct before, during, and after the October 8, 1862, engagement at Perryville, Kentucky, overly deliberate, had as their first mission securing control of Kentucky and Middle Tennessee. They would then, the administration hoped, establish a permanent Federal presence in East Tennessee and liberate the region’s Unionist population. Upon assuming command, Rosecrans immediately recognized that he first needed to impose clear organization on his field forces, which were then officially designated the Fourteenth Corps. Once he finished the process of ensuring his command had secure possession of Nashville, Rosecrans organized his ten divisions into three wings and gave command of them to the three senior officers he inherited from Buell. Rosecrans had no reservations about giving Thomas command of the “Center Wing,” which, consisting of four divisions, was the largest. Thomas had compiled an eminently respectable combat record during the first year and a half of the war, and Rosecrans had a long-standing relationship with him that was characterized by mutual professional respect and not a little personal warmth.1 Thomas’s assignment reflected the fact that he fully possessed the respect and confidence of senior and subordinate officers alike. The...