Lincoln and the Union Governors

The War Becomes Long

38 c h a p t e r t h r e e The War Becomes Long During the fall and winter of 1861–62, the mobilization of the Union armies proceeded through the governors. The goals established by Lincoln in the summer, however, were not completely achieved. Volunteers raised by the governors and the states reached 640,000 in December 1862, while the regular army barely increased by 4,000 over its prewar strength.1 Fervor for the fighting and the novelty of life in the army had significantly declined, causing resistance to long-term enlistments to increase. The need for men at home to harvest crops and provide for their families as winter approached further contributed to the difficulties in raising troops. Governors continued to complain to Lincoln and the War Department about the lack of arms, provisions, and federal financial support for their regiments. Gubernatorial authority over the state troops in the field created confusion as the Union armies moved into the South. David Tod of Ohio reflected this uncertainty after he replaced William Dennison as governor in January 1862. He asked the War Department “whether he had control of his state troops in camp and in the field after they had been mustered into federal service” and also wanted to know whether the U.S. Treasury would repay the states for “all the money expended directly and indirectly in the raising equipping, sustaining and mustering of the troops.”2 Much to the dismay of Tod, no clear answers to his questions were forthcoming from the War Department. The War Becomes Long | 39 The concept of a national army, independent of the states and the governors, did not become a reality until much later in the war.3 Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase, a former Ohio governor and the leading Radical Republican in Washington, announced at this time that he would “rather have no regiments raised in Ohio than that they should not be known as Ohio regiments.”4 The governors and state officials, however, conceded tactical authority over their state troops to the War Department and the commanding generals as they became part of a larger federal army. Still, they reserved the right to retain a close relationship with their troops in the South and to urge Lincoln and the War Department to replace generals they disliked, usually with generals from their own states. As the war became hard in 1862, the Northern governors became more energetic and resourceful in attending to their troops in the field. Several governors visited their men in camps near rebel lines; others sent their military adjutants. Lincoln provided tacit support for these visits, though he did not seem to encourage them. He probably believed that, in addition to providing needed medical supplies and other material and personal assistance, the governors’ appearances at the front boosted morale and increased support for the war at home. No one was more active in attending to the needs—and the morale—of the troops than Governor Morton. He frequently corresponded with Indiana officers and soldiers and sent state officials into the camps to determine their needs and ensure that they were met. However, General Henry W. Halleck, commander of the Western Department, did not appreciate the governor’s interference. Halleck became involved in an unnecessary dispute with Morton over the governor’s attempt to provide supplies for Indiana troops in his theater.5 As a result of Morton’s efforts, the Indiana Sanitary Commission, a private aid society inspired by the creation of the U.S. Sanitary Commission in June 1861 and supported by Lincoln, was formed in March 1862. The Indiana Sanitary Commission, which remained independent of the national association, was criticized by the U.S. commission for its “indiscreet zeal” in recognizing “state lines even in its administration of mercy on the battlefield.” For his attention to their needs, Indiana troops affectionately referred to Morton as 40 | The War Becomes Long “the soldiers’ governor.” On several occasions, Morton went south and bivouacked with the Union army in Tennessee and Mississippi. A soldier in the Army of the Cumberland wrote home, “You ought to hear the shouts of the soldiers from all states whenever Governor Morton is mentioned.”6 Immediately after the horrific Battle of Shiloh (Pittsburg Landing ) in western Tennessee in April 1862, Governors Morton, Yates of Illinois, and Louis P. Harvey of Wisconsin chartered steamboats; gathered surgeons...