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132 7 Saving the army of tenneSSee: The ConFederaTe rear guard aT ringgoLd gap Justin S. Solonick Defeated and demoralized, Confederate General Braxton Bragg retreated toward Dalton, Georgia, on November 26, 1863. Primarily concerned with saving his fighting men, Bragg set his infantry in motion first with his wagon trains and artillery to follow. The soft November roads, still soggy from weeks of rain, made it difficult for the latter to keep up with the infantry. “The trains were toiling forward over a single narrow road, the artillery wheels cutting into the soft mud up to the axles, and requiring heavy details to prize them out, and the rear wagon was still in sight when the enemy flushed with victory and pressing forward in energetic pursuit appeared.”1 General Patrick Cleburne had covered only about two miles since the morning’s march began when an unfamiliar messenger presented himself to the Irish general. The messenger insisted that General William J. Hardee had instructed Cleburne to drive his division toward Dalton. Cleburne expressed concern at the messenger’s directions. His division, the strongest intact after Grant’s thrashing of the Army of Tennessee at Chattanooga, had been charged with acting as the army’s rear guard and protecting the struggling wagon and artillery train. In short, Cleburne’s 4,157-man division represented the sole thin gray line between the Army of Tennessee and the pursuing Union juggernaut.2 Cleburne argued with the messenger and explained the significance of his current mission. Should Cleburne drive toward Dalton he would have to abandon both the Confederate artillery and wagons to the Union. The messenger explained that he had been sleep-deprived for several days and that it was possible he had misunderstood Hardee’s orders. Since this message constituted a verbal order and lacked the weight of written instruction, Cleburne used his better judgment and disregarded the hazardous suggestion. Later dispatches would reveal that this verbal order was indeed erroneous Saving the army of tenneSSee 133 and that Cleburne had never been ordered to abandon his post as the Confederate rear guard.3 Cleburne’s column reached the town of Ringgold at approximately 10:00 p.M. on November 26. Later that night the weary and hungry Confederates received orders to cross Chickamauga Creek and make camp on the opposite side in order to place this natural obstacle between his division and the Union army. The Stonewall of the West could not believe this ludicrous order. Fording the river on this freezing November night while his men stood exhausted would have proven disastrous. Determined not to lose his men to pneumonia, he decided to once again let his better judgment prevail. About that time Cleburne received further instructions from Bragg. The commanding general directed his subordinate to adopt a strong defensive position and engage in a rearguard action that would stymie the Union pursuit and allow the remainder of the Confederate army to escape. Cleburne, fearing that he might not be able to hold back the Union juggernaut, requested the order in writing so as to protect himself from later scrutiny should he fail. Cleburne’s division bivouacked on the north bank of the Chickamauga and crossed the creek at 3:00 a.M. as it began the next morning’s march.4 Bragg’s written instructions arrived as Cleburne’s division was striking camp. It read, “you [Cleburne] will take a strong defensive position in the gorge of the mountain and attempt to check pursuit of the enemy. He must be punished until our trains and the rear of our troops get well advanced.”5 Shortly after crossing Chickamauga Creek, Cleburne passed through the town of Ringgold. Georgians had named the town after Mexican War hero Major Samuel Ringgold who died of wounds received at the battle of Palo Alto. In 1863, two to three thousand citizens inhabited its one hundred plus brick buildings and cottages. In addition, the sleepy little town sported two churches, a hotel, and a short storehouse that functioned as a freight depot near the railroad.6 At Catoosa Station, Bragg’s messenger intercepted Cleburne with an addendum to his previous orders. The message read, “Tell General Cleburne to hold his position at all hazards, and to keep back the enemy until the transportation of the army is secured, the salvation of which depends on him.”7 Cleburne continued on his course and proceeded to inspect the terrain opposite Ringgold. The ground just east of Ringgold appeared...

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