Halleck: Lincoln's Chief of Staff

VII. The Guillotine for Unsuccessful Generals

CHAPTER SEVEN THE GUILLOTINE FOR UNSUCCESSFUL GENERALS he reverberations of Pope's defeat pounded in Halleck's eardrums. He "scarcely slept" for four nights and was "almost worn out." Two days after the battle, September 2, struggling to regain his composure, he assured his wife: "Everybody now admits that if I had not brought McClellan's army here when I did, we should have been lost." Halleck was convinced that he had made no mistakes. On September 5 he boasted: "I ... believe I have saved the capital from the terrible crisis brought upon us by the stupidity of others. I got McClellan's army here just in rime—and barely that—to save us." But the echo of defeat would not die and at times it drove Halleck to distraction. Having no ambition and wanting to resign if he "could do so conscientiously," he expressed a desire to "go back to private life as soon as possible and never again to put my foot in Washington."1 By the end of November he was recovering and stated in his official report: "This short and active campaign . . . accomplished thegreat andimportant object of covering the capital till troops could be collected for its defense." Bitterly he added: "Had the Army of the Potomac arrived a few days earlier the rebel army could have been easily defeated and perhaps destroyed ." Halleck's strategy had not been given a fair trial. Halleck made his official attack on McClellan three months after Second Bull Run; others had not waited that long. On August 29, 1 Wilson, "General Halleck," he.cit., XXXVI,558. T 8o Henry Wager Halleck at the height of Pope's campaign, Stanton had written Halleck calling for a report "touching McClellan's disobedience of orders and consequent delay of support to the Army of Virginia." The wording of the request indicated that Stanton was looking for grounds on which to replace McClellan. But it was too early for a conclusive answer and moreover, Halleck was opposed to political interference with the military. He gave Stanton a short review of the reasons McClellan's men were withdrawn from the Peninsula, then said: "The order was not obeyed with the promptness I expected and the national safety, in my opinion, required." However, he hastened to add "the reasons given for not moving earlier was the delay in getting off the sick," and made no comment. "When General McClellan's movement was begun, it was rapidly carried out; but there was an unexpected delay in commencing it. General McClellan reports the delay was unavoidable."2 Halleck could be a master of objective reporting when he so desired; Stanton could not drop McClellan on the basis of his reply. Meanwhile, Lincoln was using the General-in-chief as a political shield. After Pope's defeat, Halleck had placed McClellan in charge of the demoralized troops streaming into Washington. When McClellan finished organizing the men in the entrenchments, Halleck asked him who had been nominated for future field command. McClellan replied that he had not designated a successor because he was willing to take command in person. Halleck informed Little Mac that his authority did not extend beyond the defenses of the capital and that no decision had yet been made as to who would lead the army when it took the field. Lincoln, however, had decided that McClellan was the only competent general available for command. On the morning of September 2, he and Halleck called upon McClellan at the general's house. Lincoln diagnosed the situation as bad and, according to Halleck, said to McClellan: "General, you will take command of the forces in the field." McClellan later claimed that Lincoln said "O.R., Ser.Ill, II, 872; Donald (ed.), Inside Lincoln's Cabinet, 116; O.R., Ser. I, XII,Part 3, p.739. The Guillotine for Unsuccessful Generals 81 Washington was lost and asked if he would take over, as a favor to the President. McClellan replied that he would. The entire occurrence came as a surprise to Halleck.8 But Lincoln, after making a decision that angered the very vocal Radicals in his own party, gradually changed his story until the stigma came to rest with Halleck. On the afternoon of September 2, Lincoln told his Cabinet that Halleck had agreed to McClellan's appointment and that the General-in-chief supported the President's views. On September 8, Lincoln told...