Aristotle's "Best Regime": Kingship, Democracy, and the Rule of Law

2. The Citizen

2 the citien It is commonly asserted that the citizen is a common-sense beginning point for political analysis.1 But is this true? At first glance, Politics 3.1 appears to suggest that Aristotle intends as the first order of business to address the concept of the citizen and who ought to be called a citizen (3.1.1274b41– 75a1). It must be noted that the requirement to address the citizen first arises out of the assertion that “since the polis belongs among composite things, and like other composite wholes is made up of many parts, it is clear that the first thing that must be sought is the citizen; for the polis is a certain multitude of citizens” (3.1.1274b38–41). Now it is true that a composite whole is made of parts, but Aristotle here “jumps the gun” and gives us the answer before we have examined the facts, that a polis or political community is a composite whole of citizens. The question here is whether this is a true start or another false start. The present section suggests that the inquiry into the polis by means of considering the concept of the citizen is indeed a false start, one that points to the concept that will be the central concern in order to be able to understand politics— i.e., the regime. But before we answer this question, let us examine more closely the discussion of the citizen that Aristotle presents at Politics 1.1–.5. aristotle’s use of the citien Aristotle opens the investigation of the citizen with the claim that “There is often much dispute about the citizen, for not everyone agrees that the same person is a citizen” (3.1.1275a2–3). He goes on to say that he who is a citizen of one regime may not also be a citizen of another (3.1.1275a3–4). This poses an interesting problem. If the concept of the citizen defines political activity then the definition of a citizen should not be regime-dependent . Rather, the definition of the citizen should be an independent univer1 . See Arendt 1958, Beiner 1983, and Lockyer 1988, 56–8. Nichols 1991, 55–61, to a limited extent also overemphasizes the importance of the citizen in Aristotle’s political thought. For a different treatment see Simpson 1998, 140–8. 28 aristotle’s “best regime” sal.2 Since this is not the case [i.e., Aristotle holds the citizen to be relative to the regime and not wholly independent from it], one is forced to question, if not to reject, the view that the concept of the citizen is useful to understand political things. This is what I believe Aristotle ultimately intends in his discussion of the citizen in Politics 3. Thus, in showing the inadequacy of the concept of the citizen and its utter regime-dependency, he points to the centrality of the regime, or politeia, as the key concept to understanding politics and human political systems. Yet it is necessary to examine Aristotle’s discussion of the citizen to further demonstrate this argument. Let us return to the text of Politics 3.1. Aristotle goes on to narrow or refine what we understand to be a citizen. First, he removes from consideration the honorary citizens (3.1.1275a4–6). He then denies that a citizen is one who inhabits a place. He says that “aliens and slaves are [also] partners in habitation ” (3.1.1275a6–8). He then argues that being able to bring suit or to be subject to the laws also fails to define who is a citizen (3.1.1275a8–11). Aristotle claims that even in places where aliens are not able to bring suit directly, they are nevertheless able to do so through patrons or third parties. Thus they “share in this sort of association in an incomplete sense” (3.1.1275a11–14). Aristotle continues to exclude those who are not citizens in the sense he intends to develop. The two examples of those who are not strictly citizens are children, “who are not yet enrolled because of age,” and the elderly, “who have been relieved”: They must be admitted to be citizens in a sense, but not unqualifiedly, but rather with the addition of “incomplete” or “superannuated” or something else of this sort—it makes no difference, as what has been said is clear. (3.1.1275a14–18) The reason the above claim...