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7 does aristotle underrate democracy? a reevaluation of nicomachean ethics 8.10.1160b19–21 It is generally assumed that Aristotle holds democracy to be a deviant regime (politeia) and, as such, it cannot be choiceworthy (haietos).1 In fact Aristotle is usually cited as an antidemocrat if not a severe and hostile critic of democracy.2 One key section in the Aristotelian corpus that is usually cited to support this reading is Nicomachean Ethics 8.10. But the usual interpretation of Aristotle’s supposed view of democracy is incorrect, because in Nicomachean Ethics 8.10 he actually gives high praise to democracy, although that praise may be obscured by its presentation within the text.3 Before considering the Nicomachean Ethics 8.10 passage, we should address the contention that the praise of democracy is obscured in the text. In trying to answer this question, it is interesting to note the reason for Thomas Hobbes’s hostility toward Aristotle. Hobbes’s hostility is due to his belief that Aristotle is either a democrat or one whose understanding of politics lends support to democracy. Hobbes favors absolute rule of the sovereign and construes Aristotle as a partisan of democracy; this is one of his many reasons for rejecting Aristotle’s arguments about political life (Hobbes 1991). 1. Strauss puts forth the relationship between the polis and the politeia (regime) in the most straightforward manner of anybody studying Aristotle. He says that a regime (politeia) is the term that Aristotle gives to that which orders the polis. Or, said more philosophically, as Strauss puts it, the polis is the matter (hyle), whereas the politeia is the form (eidos) that gives shape to the matter (Strauss 1978, 45–6, and 1989, 32–3; cf. Politics 3.1.1274b37–37 and 3.6.1278b8–12). 2. To name only three examples of those who hold this view, see Farrar 1988, 266ff; Pascal and Gruengard 1989, 11; and Mulgan 1977, 60, 73. 3. Others (Nichols 1991, 114–21; Lindsay 1994, 1992a, 1992b) argue that Aristotle gives a qualified defense of democracy. Although I find their arguments, mostly dealing with the Politics, persuasive, I do not think they take the evidence and their arguments to their logical conclusion—that Aristotle praises democracy, albeit of a certain type, more highly than any other regime. does aristotle underrate democracy? 155 But why do others not see this democratic argument in Aristotle? I suggest that it is because he argues for democracy didactically and through the interaction of the several arguments presented throughout Politics 3. But this view forces one to ask, why does Aristotle write in such an indirect way about democracy? The best answer to this question is to say that he is rhetorically addressing a specific audience. the problem of the audience Aristotle could not openly praise democracy because of the audience that he rhetorically addresses in the Nicomachean Ethics. He describes those who are excluded from being taught political science: the young, the inexperienced, the immature, and the incontinent (akrates) (NE 1.3.1094b23–a13), qualities that exclude one from being a student of politics. Those who possess the opposite characteristics are considered suitable to study politics—i.e., the elder, the experienced, the mature, and the continent. Thus Aristotle is defining the rhetorical audience of the text. Lord and Aristide Tessitore have argued that the gentlemen (kalakagathoi) or morally serious men, are the audience Aristotle considered suitable for the study of politics (see Bodéüs 1993, 97–132; Lord 1984, 1987; Tessitore 1990). Since these persons would be partisans of either, at best, aristocracy or, at least, a refined oligarchy, where education and good birth are stressed more than wealth simply, Aristotle would not get far praising democracy. Since these scholars (e.g., Lord and Tessitore) construe Aristotle’s overall purpose in the Nicomachean Ethics to be teaching these morally serious persons, who will end up being the statesmen or lawgivers of most cities (see Bodéüs 1993; contrast Vander Waerdt 1991, 1985), it is reasonable to think that Aristotle would not desire to upset this audience by praising democracy. (They would be upset because democracy is a regime toward which those serious persons are generally inclined to be hostile.) Instead, he obscures his praise so that only the careful reader will discover or become aware of his point. nicomachean ethics 8.10.1160b19–21 The key sentence appealed to in support of the opinion that Aristotle considers democracy...

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