Andrew Jackson, Southerner

XII: “The Old Hero Stands Heedless of the Pelting Storm”

105 XII “The Old Hero Stands Heedless of the Pelting Storm” Jackson made his decision to pursue the presidency for a second time because of the “corrupt bargain,” the conspiracy that he believed had stolen the 1824 election from him and “the people.” The 1828 election was a personal crusade for Old Hickory. As the campaign developed, several key questions arose about Jackson’s southern identity. With Adams possessing a strong grip on electoral votes in New England and with Clay wielding his influence over the West, winning the election depended in large part on convincing southerners that Jackson best represented their interests. The corrupt bargain charge played a prominent role in the 1828 campaign from the moment “the old cod-fish” Adams, as one Jackson man described the president, appointed Clay secretary of state. The Kentuckian continued to deny the charges that he had conspired to win his cabinet position by approaching both Jackson and Adams with the offer of his influence on the House election. While Jackson preferred not to discuss the matter publicly, when it became necessary to do so, he provided what he considered to be definitive proof of the plot. He named Pennsylvania congressman James Buchanan as the liaison who brought him Clay’s proposal . Clay denied the charge, while Buchanan equivocated. It made no difference to Jackson. “The people now understand their wicked course,” he wrote Coffee.1 Convinced that he was fighting for the people, Jackson aligned himself with savvy politicians in a national coalition capable of victory in 1828. In June 1826 Vice President Calhoun offered to join Jackson “on the side of liberty” in the fight against the “corrupt patronage” that Adams and Clay surely would use to consolidate their power. Jackson accepted Calhoun’s offer with the statement “We shall march hand in hand . . . on the side of the people.” Having secured a strong southern ally, Jackson also benefited from New York senator Martin Van Buren’s decision to throw his support behind Old Hickory. Van Buren had worked assiduously for Crawford’s 106 | Andrew Jackson, Southerner nomination in 1824, believing that the Georgian was the safest candidate to protect states’ rights against encroaching national power. Calculating that Crawford possessed little chance of winning the presidency in 1828, Van Buren switched to Jackson as the best political alternative. Adams and Clay had shown their true Federalist colors, and Calhoun was a possible obstacle to Van Buren’s own presidential aspirations. Jackson’s age and his desire to serve only one term undoubtedly encouraged Van Buren that if he made himself invaluable to Jackson, then Old Hickory might later support him for the presidency. Tennessean Alfred Balch, a Van Buren ally, used his influence to pave the way for the New Yorker’s acceptance by Jackson’s southern supporters. Sam Houston also assured the General of Van Buren’s fidelity: he “will support you in all good faith . . . your friends who know him best are satisfied as to his course.”2 During the 1824 election the Jackson campaign found it unnecessary to publicly declare its commitment to protecting southern rights. The circumstances leading up to the 1828 election were different, however. Supporters of Calhoun and Crawford wanted assurances that Jackson would protect slavery and continue the removal of Native Americans from fertile southern soil. Van Buren acknowledged these regional interests in a January 1827 missive to Thomas Ritchie, editor of the Richmond Enquirer: “Political combinations between the inhabitants of the different states are unavoidable & the most natural & beneficial to the country is that between the planters of the South and the plain Republicans of the north.” Van Buren believed that the proposed alliance would create loyal partisan supporters, unmask the corruptness of the Adams-Clay cabal, and ensure Jackson’s victory as the virtuous candidate.3 It was not that simple, though. On the one hand, Jackson had eliminated threats to regional security posed by Native Americans and runaway slaves, had seized territory on which southern planters could grow cash crops, and by virtue of his own identity as a slave owner, would almost certainly ensure slavery’s continued protection from the growing antislavery clamor. On the other hand, his appeal to “the people” threatened to destroy the South’s republican institutions and undermine its racial order. If the lower classes began using Jacksonian rhetoric, then the southern gentry potentially would lose control over the men and women who had heretofore shown them deference. If white...