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109 6 The Tide Turns “Throughout my life,” Train recalled, “I’ve been a tremendously lucky fellow.”1 In the summer of 1971, as he entered his sixth decade, little had happened to suggest otherwise. Health, wealth, and most recently, notoriety surrounded a successful career dedicated to the common good. Train had worked hard but fate had placed few major obstacles in his path. His good fortune, however, was about to change. It all began with Nixon. Over the years Nixon had competed with two leading Republicans to carry the banner of the party, New York governor Nelson Rockefeller and Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater. In many respects, the former represented the traditional, northeastern wing of Republicanism, which favored active, if not better-managed, government. The latter represented a growing number in the West and South, more ideologically driven and hostile to federal power. Nixon remained in the middle. Caring little for domestic policy, his attention focused on the international stage, his administration aimed to unite the party. He delegated significant domestic authority to subordinates with only the broadest mandate for moderation.2 The result was, arguably, a rather convoluted record. On the one hand, as his first term passed its halfway point, Nixon had abandoned the harsh rhetoric and abrasive tactics for which he was famous. He had in many respects fulfilled his election promise to “bring the American people together.”3 His cabinet was largely moderate and won praise, Hickel the lone exception, and his first budget hardly attacked the Great Society.4 While he supported welfare reform that instituted work requirements, he also increased federal expenditures. He indexed Social Security payments to the rate of inflation, expanded consumer and employee protections, supported lowering the voting age to eighteen and signed the Equal Rights Amendment. According to his speechwriter, William Safire, Nixon’s “heart was on the right while his head was with FDR, slightly left of CONSERVATIVE CONSERVATIONIST 110 center.”5 On the other hand, however, Nixon coupled this surprising spate of liberalism with actions pleasing to conservatives. He nominated several Supreme Court justices hostile to civil rights. He advocated “law and order,” a new “war” on illegal drugs, a crusade against obscenity, and opposition to both abortion and forced busing. His government reorganization stemmed from a genuine desire to decrease bureaucracy and he championed “revenue sharing,” allowing states more autonomy in the expenditure of funds. In total, many of the administration ’s actions appeared a hodgepodge of both liberalism and conservatism, a convoluted policy indeed.6 The result may have been contradictory overall but was just the opportunity that allowed Train to flourish. Appealing to Nixon’s partisan instincts even as he encouraged the moderate wing of the party—the traditionalists more open to the bipartisanship he valued—Train helped craft the record of accomplishment that most environmentalists applauded. Had Nixon assumed the Presidency with a firm domestic agenda or the commitment to conservatism that pundits predicted, Train’s story would have been di≠erent. Train was, in short, fortunate. By the middle of 1971, however, Nixon, increasingly sensitive to criticism, had begun to have doubts. Washington Post columnist David Broder wrote that Nixon “seemed more unpredictable, more mysterious, more inconsistent” three years into his term than at the outset. Voters were “alienated,” Broder concluded , with “trust and confidence” the big issues in the pending presidential election.7 Ben Wattenberg’s 1970 text, The Real Majority, argued that Republicans could transform American politics by appealing to the “unyoung, unpoor, and unblack.”8 As his advisors cited the book, Nixon warmed to his famous “Southern Strategy.” He could win with white southerners, northern Catholics, rightwing labor leaders, and other socially conservative Democrats alienated by the 1960s counterculture. He could drive a wedge between the “silent majority” and upper-class liberals who dominated the Democratic establishment.9 Nixon had touted such a policy for months and its roots were in many of his conservative first-term accomplishments. Now with the 1972 election approaching, however, he might more forcibly tack to the right, perhaps alienating many moderate Republicans but winning more votes in the aggregate. Challenging bureaucracy and demonizing regulations did not bode well for the environment—or Train. “The environment is not a good political issue ,” Nixon told Haldeman soon after the midterm elections. “We are doing too much,” he concluded, “catering to the left in all of this.” The administration could never win the environmental vote. “You can’t out-Muskie Muskie.”10...

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