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21 The AtlantaCampaign "A Spirit of Jealousy" MILD, SPRINGLIKE, but unusually dry weather ushered in May, as Sherman made final arrangements to advance his armies. The soldiers stripped down to light marching order, leaving behind all cooking utensils except coffeepots, frying pans, and an occasional camp kettle. Major Connolly, writing to his wife, seemed resigned to the coming operations: "My goodness! I do dread starting out in the dust and hot sun, after such a long period of ease, but the rebels must be whipped, and since we can't do it sitting in the house, I suppose we must content ourselves with going after them."1 The original campaign plan envisioned by Sherman was a wide sweep southwest of Dalton to Rome by McPherson's Army of the Tennessee. When it became apparent that two divisions of the XVII Corps would not arrive in time to participate, Sherman realized that McPherson's remaining five divisions of twenty-three thousand troops would be insufficient to operate so far from his main force. Nonetheless , he maintained the concept of using his cherished old command as the pivotal army of the campaign, while the Army of the Cumberland served in a support role.2 The strategic plan eventually developed was in fact not Sherman's but Thomas's, the Virginian conceiving the idea during his February Dalton reconnaissance. He proposed to use Taylor's Ridge as a screen and march his entire army through Snake Creek Gap, thirteen miles south of Dalton, to Resaca, where the Western and Atlanta Railroad would be cut. All the while McPherson and Schofield would keep Johnston occupied by demonstrations against Rocky Face Ridge to the west and Crow Valley to the north. Having turned his position, Johnston would either have to fight or escape east into barren country. Sherman accepted the plan, though with one main revision: the flanking column would be the Army of the Tennessee. But Sherman, who never gave Thomas his due credit for the concept, had made a 1. George E. Cooper, "Report on the Operations of the Medical Department of the Army of the Cumberland through Georgia, in the Summer of 1864," in Surgeon General'sOffice, Medical and Surgical History, 1(2)1299; Angle, Three Years in the Army of the Cumberland, 203;Widney to parents, May i,1864, Lyman S. Widney Letters, KNBP. 2. McMurry, Atlanta 1864, 57; Castel, Decision in the West, 121. THE A T L A N T A C A M P A I G N 395 major error, according to historian Albert Castel. He should have adopted Thomas's original plan or, if intent upon using the Army of the Tennessee, a variation of it— namely, to reinforce McPherson with one of Thomas's corps, which ultimately he did, but too late. Scholars have lined up on both sides of the issue, Richard McMurry concurring that Sherman had chosen to send "a relatively weak column to Snake Creek Gap" and John Marszalek questioning whether or not Thomas's large force would "have moved that resolutely."3 Several points are salient. First, whether good or bad, Thomas's bold plan revealed that he was not simply a defensive general; he was coming of age. Second, whether or not his original plan would have worked is a nonhistorical question, but an interesting comparison can be made with the Tullahoma campaign. In that instance Thomas seized Hoover's Gap but then squandered his success and subsequently stalled, thus giving the Confederates time to withdraw to Tullahoma. If Thomas performed sluggishly with one corps, would he have acted more boldly with three? Third, what was the evolving relationship between Sherman and Thomas? Not long before the campaign commenced, Thomas Ewing wrote Sherman that he should have replaced Thomas for his perceived delay in attacking Missionary Ridge. Sherman, in his response, set the record straight that Grant had directed affairs. Regarding Thomas, he wrote: "If we were to dispose of such men as Thomas summarily who would take his place? We are not masters as Napoleon was. He [Napoleon] could make & unmake on the spot. We must take the tools provided us, and in the order prescribed by Rank of which the Lawjudges." Hardly a ringing endorsement of Thomas, Sherman's statement reveals more a respect of his seniority and the lack of a realistic alternative. Finally, this would not be the last time Sherman would show preferential treatment toward the Army of the Tennessee . Indeed, McMurry refers to the...

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