A Cold War Turning Point: Nixon and China, 1969-1972

7 Chinese at the UN and Kissinger’s Second Visit to Beijing

120 7 T he administration continued to discuss the UN issue and linked it to Kissinger’s second, public trip to Beijing, scheduled for late October. Kissinger recognized that Nixon had been mulling over the public relations side of rapprochement with Haldeman, but advised the president “to tell Bush to delay the goddamn thing no matter what it costs.” He worried that the Chinese might not “follow our game plan” and announce Kissinger’s second visit on October 30. Then, the day after the vote, “we announce I’m going to China,” which would be a public relations disaster. “For selfish reasons,” Kissinger continued, “I would prefer to delay it so that they can’t piss on me.” Nixon’s reply on the tape is unclear, but Kissinger recognized that the president had to make “a judgment call. Either way has advantages and disadvantages . If Taiwan gets kicked out, which in my view, I think the vote is probably not as a close as Bill [Rogers] thinks. I’ve looked over their list, I don’t think the list is—then is it better for me to go after they’ve been kicked out? I don’t know. But, of course, they could also put on a show while I’m there and make it look embarrassing if the debate was going on.” He lamented the difficulty of the decision, noting that “we are torn ourselves. At some point, we lean slightly for doing it,” then “against doing it.” He also conceded “this isn’t Bill’s fault that he says they’re tricking us. But we’ve tried to move it as early into the congressional session as we could and we thought that the UN vote would be at the end of November rather than the end of October.” Kissinger also explained that while the White House controlled the announcements of both Kissinger’s and Nixon’s visits to China, he and Haig feared “the impression it will make on them. We’ve couched this in the form of a personal request by you” to make the announcements before any vote on CHINESE AT THE UN AND KISSINGER’S SECOND VISIT TO BEIJING chinese at the un and kissinger’s second visit to beijing 121 Chinese representation occurred in the UN. Nixon asked what would happen if Taiwan did get kicked out: kissinger: Well, then I think hell will break loose in this country anyway, don’t you? nixon: I don’t know. I guess so. Some— kissinger: Conservatives will scream. You’ll be asked to veto this thing in the Security Council. nixon: I can’t do that, can I? kissinger: Well, you could make a helluva fight if you wanted to. You can make a case that you can’t. But you could— nixon: Well then let me ask you this, we don’t intend to do it, do we? We don’t intend to veto it? We couldn’t do that, could we? kissinger: No. nixon: So therefore we’ve got to make the case, either Rogers has to get to make it now, or somebody has to, that legally it can’t be done. Kissinger generously defended Bush and Rogers, and predicted that the margin of the UN vote would be so large that conservatives and Jiang would not be able “to use that as an alibi. I think basically the votes are set now. I do not think it affects the votes of anybody.” Nixon agreed but worried that conservatives who had made their peace with the China trip “would be goddamned pissed off if we kick Taiwan out” of the UN. Kissinger, however, argued that it would “hurt you more with right-wingers if I go to Beijing after Taiwan has been kicked out. You see, under this scheme, even if State does not delay the debate I will not be there when the vote is going on. The vote will be about five days later,” that is, on October 29 or 30. Nixon accepted Kissinger’s argument and remarked that “it looks like we’re sucking up to” China if Kissinger departed right after the vote. Indeed, “there will be strong pressures on us to just sink the whole China thing from the right,” and the conservatives would 122 a cold war turning point argue that “Kissinger should not go over there and talk after those...