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54 4 T he Nixon administration dismissed Mao’s statement as propaganda rather than a desire to abandon rapprochement. Kissinger called Mao’s statement “remarkably bland,” one that made “no threats” against the United States, offered “no commitments” to Hanoi, and, unlike his previous public statements, did not refer to other bilateral issues such as Taiwan. It should instead be seen as a propaganda move designed to “embarrass” the Soviets while proclaiming Beijing’s support for Sihanouk and the North Vietnamese leadership. At the same time, the comments warned Hanoi not to negotiate with the United States. The CIA also subscribed to this theory. Stoessel and Rogers believed that Beijing had reacted sharply only “for propaganda effect” and predicted that once the United States withdrew its forces from Cambodia the Chinese would resume the Warsaw talks. Rogers told Nixon that the “restraint” that characterized the cancellation of the May 20 should be compared to the belligerent tone of the cancellation of the February 20, 1969, meeting. An old friend of Kissinger’s, however, threw cold water on this assessment . Professor Ernst Winters told Kissinger that his contact at the Chinese embassy in Paris wanted to know if the Cambodian invasion was “a highly tactical move or intense campaign. They wanted to know who they should talk to here. What I think we should do is tell them that they can talk to us here and that if they want to they should call General Walters. It has two advantages. One, we can surface it if we want to and two, we can establish a channel which the Dutchman has never brought off. This man said he has never seen them in such a state of agitation. He said they called him in which is unheard of.” The president called this “very interesting and should be explored to the hilt.” Kissinger then asked Winters to deliver the following message: THE POST-CAMBODIA CHILL AND THE PAKISTANI CHANNEL the post-cambodia chill and the pakistani channel 55 The United States has no aggressive intentions concerning Communist China. On the contrary, we would like to establish regular relations with her, recognizing our differences in ideology. We have no interest in establishing military bases in Vietnam, and we believe that a peace that takes into account everyone’s interests in that area can be achieved. Dr. Kissinger is prepared to talk to a person of stature on the Communist Chinese side if this can be done secretly. The Chinese can reply by getting in touch with Major General Vernon Walters, Senior U.S. Military Attaché, American Embassy, Paris. No one but the President is aware of this message and the Chinese reply should be through General Walters and nobody else. The Chinese, however, ignored the entreaty. Throughout that summer, the Chinese repeatedly rebuffed Walters’s attempts to personally deliver two new, but similar, messages. One evening, after a reception at the Polish embassy, he realized he was alone in the courtyard with his Chinese counterpart Fang Wen. Walters approached him and said that he had “a message for your government from my President.” Fang Wen “looked at me and his mouth dropped open. He tried to say something and he could hardly speak. Finally he gasped in French ‘I’ll tell them; I’ll tell them’ and “jumped into his Mercedes-Benz and drove off.” While Fang Wen may have told his superiors about his encounter, they did not contact Walters. The administration, however, tried to remain positive about the potential for rapprochement. Zhou had told the Yugoslav ambassador to China that while the Cambodian invasion had forced the cancellation of the June 20 Warsaw meeting, he viewed the break as “only temporary” and that “it was China’s hope that the talks would continue.” Stoessel also reported that Tom Simons and two of Lei Yang’s staffers had a brief, “cordial” meeting at the Chinese embassy. The Chinese read a statement that said that due to “the current situation,” Beijing deemed it “unsuitable to discuss and decide upon a date” for the next ambassadorial-level talks. Simons replied that the United States “regrets this. We believe that the interests of both” countries “would be served by an early resumption of substantial exchanges at the ambassadorial level.” He nevertheless called the statement “non-polemical.” The administration dialed down their optimism as the summer progressed , and wondered whether infighting within the PRC leadership had affected rapprochement. Kissinger worried...

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