In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

THREE Mr. Lincoln'*) "Impudent"Blockade On April 17,1861, the day following President Davit 'callfor thirty-two thousand infantry, the Confederate president issued a proclamation "invitingall those who may desire, by service in private armed vessels on the high seas, to aid this Government in resisting so wanton and wicked an aggression, to make application for . . .letters of marque and reprisal to be issued under the seal of the Confederate States." The act, issued on May 21, enabled a private citizen to arm a vessel, attack Union commerce, and upon a valuation made by a board of appointed naval officers, collect 20 percent of the value of every enemy vessel captured or destroyed. Since the government had no money for the purpose, payments were to be in the form of 8 percent interest-bearing bonds of the Confederate States.1 On April 19, annoyed by Davis' call for privateers, Lincoln countered with a proclamation establishing a blockade of southern ports: "An act of insurrection against the Government of the United States has broken out. . . and the laws of the United States for the collection of revenue cannot be effectively executed therein.Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln ..., deem it advisable to set on foot a blockade.. . . For this purpose a competent force will be posted so as to prevent entrance and exit." The ports under blockade were those in South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. Lincoln warned that any privateer molesting "a vessel of the United States, or the persons or cargo aboard of her," would be subject to punishmentfor "piracy." A week later, Virginia se1 . ORN, V, 796-97, Davis Proclamation, April 17, 1861; ORA, Ser. A, I, 264,Davis Report to Congress, April 29, 1861;ORN, Ser. 2, II, 61-63. Congressional Enactment, May 14, 21, 1861. Mr. Lincoln'^ "Impudent"Blockade 33 ceded, followed by North Carolina on May 20, and Lincoln added them to the list.2 Davis considered the proclamation an astonishing document. The North had only forty-twovessels available and in commission to blockade more than thirty-fivehundred miles of coastline. Another twenty-seven vessels were available but not in commission, and beyond that, twenty-one vessels were not serviceable, includingnineships ofthe lineand three frigates. All told, the ships on the United States' list came to just ninety. Davis believed that the announcement of a "mere paper blockade" violated international law,and considered it incredible "that it could have been issued by authority." He expressed outrage over Lincoln's threat to punish privateers as pirates, since privateering had been an important and effective naval strategy against British commercialshipping during the Revolution and the War of 1812.3 Davis received some support for his criticism of Lincoln'sblockade from an unexpected source, Gideon Welles, Lincoln's own secretary of the navy. In a cabinet meetingon April 14, 1861, Welles argued that the government was engaged in putting down an insurrection, not a foreign war, inasmuch as the coastline to be blockaded was not foreign territory but an integral part of the Union. He warned Lincoln that if a blockade were proclaimed, foreign powers -would extend belligerent rights to the Confederacy. He tacitly recognized that, with only about fifty ships available , he could not interdict Confederate commerce. Britain and France would flout the blockade, and the United States would be able to do little to stop them without risk of drawing both powers into an expanded naval conflict. Welles suggested that a better policy would be to proclaim southern ports "closed." Under municipallaw, the Union navy would be empowered to seize any vessel attempting to enter a closed port and could prosecute violators as smugglers. AlthoughWelles had boned up on international law to makehis point, he may have overstated his case. He convinced most of the cabinet that the United States would look ridiculous in the eyes of the world if it announced a blockade of its own ports. Lincolnand Secretary of State William Seward agreed with Welles that Great Britain and France would in all likelihood grant belligerent status to the Confederacy,but un2 . ORN, IV, 156-57, MO, Lincoln's Proclamation,April 19, 27, 1861. 3. James R. Soley, The Blockade and the Cruucrj (New York, 1883), App. A, 241^(3; ORA, Ser. 4, I, 264, Davis to Congress, April 29, 1861. [18.118.30.253] Project MUSE (2024-04-19 08:13 GMT) 34 The Capture of New Orleans, 1862 like Welles, they believed European powers would remainwatchfully neutral . With the policy...

Share