The Capture of New Orleans 1862

EPILOGUE

Epilogue The Confederacy's IMJ of New Orleans WM fraught with consequences.Napoleon III, with imperialistic intentions toward Mexico, had sought an opportunity to recognize the Confederacy, and he hoped this might be accomplished jointly with Great Britain. In exchange for French favor, the Confederate government had already agreed not to interfere if Napoleon sent troops into Mexico. In England, the scandalous Trent affair had recently shifted from the boiling point of intervention to a grudging simmer. If Farragut had failed—followed a month later by General Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson's devastating Valley Campaign and another month later by Major General George B. McClellan's embarassing defeats in Virginia—intervention may have looked much more attractive to the European powers, especially with a good portion of the United States navy lying at the bottom of the Mississippi River. If, during the spring of 1862, any battle of the war kept Europe neutral, it was Farragut's victory on the lower Mississippi. This supposition is supported by James M. Callahan, perhaps the earliest and one of the more capable authorities on Confederate diplomacy, who claimed that Napoleon was held back by England and the people of France. Through his ministers, Napoleon had discussed intervention on several occasions with John Slidell,Confederate commissionerto France, who argued for recognition and with it the dismantling of the blockade. Earlier in the war Napoleon had contemplatedinterventionwithout Great Britain, but the capture of New Orleans changed his mind. After that, he would not consider the matter without Great Britain taking the initiative. Slidell continued to hope, but Napoleon remained noncommittal.1 1. James Morton Callahan, The Diplomatic Hillary of the Southern Confederacy (Baltimore, 1901), 101. Epilogue 259 The celebrated Louisiana and MLwujippi, two powerful rams upon which the South depended to defend New Orleans and sweep the Union fleet from the Mississippi, were products of wishful thinking and experimental technology. Despite their fearful appearance and heavy guns, the ironclads were sloths in the water, poorly designed and underpowered. Considering the South slimited resources, they probably should not have been built, at least not together at the same time and in the same place. Unfortunately , the brief moments of glory for CSS Virginia (Merrimack} and the ram Arkatua*) still lived in the minds of the Confederate Naval Office, and for four years Mallory spent almost every inflated dollar he could raise to replicate those solitary moments. Historian James Russell Soley said, "Had the Louisiana, with her armament and armor, been properly manned, equipped, and propelled so as to equal or exceed in speed Farragut's ships, nothing but a miracle would have saved him from a serious loss." Another historian, Charles B. Boynton, added nearly the same words about Mi>juidippi Unfortunately for the Confederate defenders of New Orleans, neither vessel, as designed, would have equaled the speed of Farragut's slowest vessel. Had their enginesbeen installed in time,there is some doubt whether the bulky behemoths could have stemmedthe swift current. The Tift brothers , although well-intentioned and patriotic entrepreneurs, knew nothing of boat building, and the results confirmed it. In the final weeks ofher life, Louisiana received full attention as the builders rushed it tocompletion, but all the time in the world may not have made any difference.2 More than the loss ofthe ironclads, even had they met the expectations of the Naval Office, was the loss of the lower Mississippi to the Confederacy . The port of New Orleans was closed as a center of southern trade, finance, manufacturing, and shipbuilding, and supplies and beef flowing from Texas into the eastern Confederate states had to find alternative and more exposed routes. Any possibility for trade with Europe and the West Indies endedwhen Farragut's fleet passed the forts and anchored off the levee at New Orleans. Important river towns like Natchez, Vicksburg, and Memphis -were suddenly vulnerable to attack from north and south. The Union could now invade Mississippi, Arkansas, and northern Louisiana by marshaling its troops at New Orleans and transporting them upriver, thereby forcing the Confederacy to thin its scant resources to protect its flanks. Even Mobile, a hundred miles by water to the east, could now be 2. James R. Soley, Admiral Porter, 96; Charles B. Boynton, The Hittory of the Navy During the Rebellion (2 vols.; New York, 1867), II, 213. 260 The Capture of New Orleans, 1862 reached by land or by sea. The loss of New...