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4. Division in the Ranks the supreme court decision in the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas et al. case o≠ered a powerful judicial challenge to the segregation statutes sanctioned by the 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson ruling. “Separate but equal” schools as existed under the Jim Crow system, the court held, were “inherently unequal” and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, which a≠orded all Americans equal protection under the law. At the time of the verdict, the court announced that it would provide a temporal framework for desegregation at a later date. The next year the court issued an ambiguous edict that called for “all deliberate speed” in the integration of public schools. The absence of a clear timetable in the implementation edict only invited defiance. And there would be plenty of it. Some wondered how President Dwight D. Eisenhower, a Republican who enunciated a strong states’ rights position during his 1952 presidential campaign, would respond. Brown forced Eisenhower to address the social issue he had, up to that point, avoided. In a case of circumstances making the man, Eisenhower set the tone for desegregation in the 1950s, a tone that for several years lacked much if any “deliberateness .” But an e≠ort, albeit haltingly, was underway. Finding an appropriate response to the judicial branch’s decree became the immediate problem facing southern statesmen. Dixie’s Senate delegation proved no di≠erent.1 1. Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America ’s Struggle for Equality (New York: Knopf, 1976); Salmond, “My Mind Set on Freedom”; J. Harvie Wilkinson III, From Brown to Bakke: The Supreme Court and School Integration, 1954–1978 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979); Williams, Eyes on the Prize; Wolters, Burden of Brown. All citations from the verdict taken from the text provided in New York Times, 18 May 1954, 15. division in the ranks 139 After the first Brown decision, many caucus members searched for some action—any action—they could take that would demonstrate their opposition to the ruling. Olin Johnston of South Carolina, for example, wrote a constituent , noting that “we Southern Senators have been working together trying to draw up a plan whereby something could be done to help the Southern people” in the school desegregation fight. Although several caucus members took independent action following the first ruling by questioning the verdict on the Senate floor, the caucus as a collective entity remained silent until the announcement of the implementation phase of the decision. Once that edict arrived, they began considering a possible rejoinder. Confronted with the greatest challenge to Jim Crow they had faced thus far, southern senators had di∞culty reaching a consensus on a plan of attack. Some in the group pushed for a collective statement condemning the verdict, while a smaller minority advocated no response. Members of both factions, however, recognized that their constituents demanded at least some action by their national legislators as many southern leaders on the state level had already promised.2 Cataloguing caucus members following the Brown verdict by their racial views and their level of support for massive resistance proves di∞cult since their positions often fluctuated over time. Excluding the question of civil rights, southern senators di≠ered greatly in their ideological orientation, ranging from liberal to conservative and all points in between. The diversity found in southern voting behavior regarding most issues did not manifest itself as fully when they confronted challenges to regional racial norms. A senator’s overall ideological predisposition, however, often impacted the intensity of his support for Jim Crow. The caucus’ political conservatives tended to focus on the “many, many di≠erences” between the white and black races that they believed made Jim Crow essential, just as they tended to support the campaign of massive resistance in the South. On the other hand, the South’s ideological liberals centered their arguments on the cultural significance of Jim Crow, without dwelling on alleged racial distinctions. At the same time, they voiced private disapproval of lawlessness designed to thwart integration e≠orts. The caucus’ ideological moderates held racial 2. OJ to G. P. Hill, 9 July 1954, Box 40, “Legislation—1954—Civil Rights—School Segregation ” Folder, Johnston MSS (“we Southern Senators . . .”). The day after the verdict, Senators Price Daniel of Texas, Richard Russell, and John Stennis delivered speeches that denounced the decision. CR, 83rd Cong., 2nd sess., 18 May 1954, 6742–6750. [18.191.174...

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