Manassas: A Battlefield Guide

First Manassas

First Manassas The contest for the Henry Hill. blcw 1:190. 29 29 234 234 66 66 1 2 6 3 4 5 Sudley Church Brawner House L. Dogan House J. Dogan House Groveton Confederate Cemetery Stone House Van Pelt House Portici Henry House N o r t h e r n V ir g in ia C o m m u n it y C o ll e g e Robinson House Chinn House NPS Visitor Center Stone Bridge Henry Hill D o g a n R id g e C h i n n R i d g e Bald Hill Matthews Hill B u l l R u n Y o u n g ’ s B r a n c h C h i n n B r a n c h C a t h a r p i n R u n Sudley Ford Poplar Ford Farm Ford Lewis Ford Balls Ford Y o u n g ’ s B r a nch L E E H IG H W A Y NY AVE GROVETON ROAD PAGELA ND LANE U N F I N I S H E D R A I L R O A D F E A T H E R B E D L A N E SUDLEY ROAD B A T T L E F I E L D P K W Y First Manassas Tour stop Historic site 1 0 1 mile The Road to First Manassas “You are green it is true; but they are green also; you are all green alike.” That was the response, Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell later complained, whenever he told the Lincoln administration that his Army of Northeastern Virginia was not ready to undertake active military operations in July 1861. It was not just President Abraham Lincoln and the members of his administration , however, who expected and demanded that a major battle take place in Virginia that summer. In the aftermath of the April 1861 battle at Fort Sumter a rage militarie had seized both the North and the South. Professional military officers like McDowell were acutely conscious of the complexities raising and training armies from scratch entailed and counseled caution. Ultimately, though, they were compelled to yield when it was clear that the public demanded action, and officers unable or unwilling to oblige did so at their own risk. In response to a request from Commanding General of the Army Winfield Scott, during the first week of June McDowell drew up a plan for a campaign against forces the new-born Confederate States of America were deploying between Washington and Manassas Junction, Virginia. The latter was a critical point on the map, for there two operationally important railroads intersected. The Orange and Alexandria (o&a) Railroad was the obvious line of advance for any Union force marching south and west out of Washington; the Manassas Gap Railroad connected the o&a with the Shenandoah Valley. As a consequence of the need to defend both the line of the o&a and the agriculturally rich Shenandoah Valley, Confederate military authorities had divided their forces in northern Virginia between those two points, with the Manassas Gap Railroad providing a convenient means for shifting forces back and forth between them. After presenting his plan for attacking Manassas Junction to Lincoln, who hoped popular support in the South for independence would evaporate if the North could quickly win a significant battlefield victory, McDowell was directed to execute it. On July 16 McDowell’s army left its camps around Washington and marched south and west toward Manassas Junction . Although well aware of the Confederacy’s ability to utilize the Manassas Gap Railroad to reinforce its defense of the o&a, McDowell was assured by Scott and Lincoln that a Union force in the Shenandoah Valley commanded by Brig. Gen. Robert Patterson would prevent this from happening by menacing the 11,000-man Confederate force in the Valley, commanded by Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston. Defending Manassas Junction was the responsibility of Brig. Gen. Pierre G. T. Beauregard, the 4 The Road to First Manassas hero of Fort Sumter, who had approximately 22,000 men under his command. Beauregard posted all but one of his brigades behind Bull Run, a stream that offered the first good defensive line north and east of Manassas Junction. A few miles in front of Bull Run, Beauregard placed one brigade at Fairfax Court House. As it marched west from Washington...