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6. German Philosophy, 1871-1933
- University of Nebraska Press
- Chapter
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Kim — University of Nebraska Press / Page 151 / / Heideggerian Marxism / Herbert Marcuse 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 [First Page] [151], (1) Lines: 0 to 55 ——— 6.98601pt PgVar ——— Normal Page PgEnds: TEX [151], (1) 6 German Philosophy, 1871–1933 Between 1871 and 1933 the German philosophical tradition experienced a dramatic shift: with neo-Kantianism, it began with the attempt to renew philosophy by establishing it as an exact science (following the example of mathematics ) and ended with the jettisoning of scientific philosophy by “heroic and racist realism.” This transformation coincided almost perfectly with the historical development of the Third Reich from the Second Empire, that is to say, with the passage from a liberalism influenced by feudalism and military aristocracy to the overt dictatorship of monopoly capitalism in the service of a totalitarian state. The tendencies that would spell the end of the particularly bourgeois mentality of the nineteenth century as well as its rationalist philosophy were at work from the beginning. This transition developed in the following manner: the foundations of transcendental idealism reestablished by neo-Kantianism, and also by Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology—which we will consider in a moment—were undermined by the antirationalist currents of vitalist philosophy, existentialism, historicism, and intuitionist metaphysics. Some of these philosophical ideas were beginning to move beyond the limits of bourgeois thought in an attempt to envision a rational ordering of human society. But at the same time that the most advanced elements of the bourgeoisie were being suppressed and losing their influence, these ideas, which had been the essence of the bourgeoisie, were losing their critical capacity. Rendered powerless through vulgarization (such was the case with Nietzsche’s critique of bourgeois conceptions as well as with Dilthey’s discovery of the world of history), they became instead a sanctification of the existing social order. 1. Neo-Kantianism After the fall of Hegelian philosophy, which reigned practically unchallenged in Germany up until the middle of the nineteenth century, scientific positivism sought to assume the role of philosophy. From the start, however, the power Kim — University of Nebraska Press / Page 152 / / Heideggerian Marxism / Herbert Marcuse 152 German Philosophy, 1871–1933 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 [152], (2) Lines: 55 to 58 ——— 13.5pt PgVar ——— Normal Page * PgEnds: Eject [152], (2) and the technological successes of the methods of the physical sciences proved useless when applied to human society. This “Ignorabimus”1 had implications that reached beyond metaphysics. In the face of the sterility of social theory and practice, there arose a need to sketch some well-grounded philosophical bases for a conception of the human world. This need became still more urgent in light of cyclical economic crises and as the quality of life for the lower classes, instead of increasing with technological advances, declined steadily. Even though the average living conditions tended to rise during periods of prosperity, the lower classes lost all security. A shift in ideology was certain to come about. Insofar as this transformation was achieved through bourgeois philosophy itself, it consisted of a turn to transcendental philosophy as the basis of bourgeois rationalist theory. Neo-Kantianism represented the first attempt to overcome theoretical anarchy by returning to the Kantian notion of “pure reason” as a domain autonomous from theory and practice. The true founder of neo-Kantianism was Hermann Cohen (1842–1918), professor at Marburg. He began with a new interpretation of Kantian philosophy: Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (1871) [Kant’s Theory of Experience], Kants Begründung der Ethik (1877) [The Foundation of Kant’s Ethics], and Kants Begründung der Aesthetik (1889) [The Foundation of Kant’s Aesthetics]. Cohen’s “philosophical system” provided a solid foundation for philosophy as well as for the leading scientific theory of his day: Logik der reinen Erkenntis (1902) [The Logic of Pure Knowledge], Ethik des reinen Willens (1904) [The Ethic of Pure Will], Aesthetik des reinen Gefühls (1912) [The Aesthetic of Pure Emotion]. Cohen’s collaborator, Paul Natorp (1854–1924), also a professor at Marburg, completed the philosophical system with respect to social philosophy and psychology: Sozialpaedagogik (1899)[Social Pedagogy...