Deterrence through Strength: British Naval Power and Foreign Policy under Pax Britannica

1. British Power in the Early Victorian Period

chapter one British Power in the Early Victorian Period I n 1893 Joseph Chamberlain popularized the term Pax Britannica to describe an era that had begun with the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815.1 Although Chamberlain intended the phrase to explain the pacifying effects of Britain ’s rule in India, it eventually came to be understood as the broader phenomenon whereby Britain’s overwhelming strength enforced global peace from Napoleon’s defeat until the late nineteenth century. Britain’s commercial, industrial, financial, and imperial might, all protected by the superior Royal Navy, were so imposing that they deterred war, either by compelling other nations and peoples to defer to Britain’s will, or at least by inviting them to bask in the safety afforded by a navy that upheld the status quo. The absence of large, general European wars gave credence to the concept. The idea of a Pax Britannica, however, seems to have gone out with the British Empire itself. Since the 1960s the general consensus has held that the concept is misleading at best. Whether critics address the notion of Pax Britannica directly or speculate on it in larger discussions of British foreign policy, naval power, or empire, they usually emphasize that Britain had only limited means of exercising power at the 2 british power in the early victorian period time, and that British military or naval strength played little role in preserving peace. Two questions arise about the concept of a Pax Britannica. The first concerns the Pax part of the term: was the period from 1815 to 1880 really as peaceful as the phrase implies? As many historians have pointed out, the answer is a decided no. True, there was no great European war in this period. The Crimean War (1853–56) was the only conflict between more than two great powers, and it was fairly limited in terms of participants, length, and geographic scope. Still, numerous other military occupations, naval demonstrations, bombardments , blockades, and small wars went on throughout the world during the so-called Pax.2 Britain took part in many such operations, and although they have been labeled wars of a “remote colonial kind,” they were not always remote or colonial, as the Syrian Crisis in the Mediterranean and near war with the United States make clear.3 Although one should keep in mind that many nations, especially Britain, used or threatened to use armed force throughout much of the century, most historians still consider this period something special.4 It stands in marked contrast to the eighteenth century, when lengthy coalition wars were commonplace and their recurrence was a continual threat in times of peace. Perhaps the Pax of the nineteenth century was not entirely peaceful, but Europe was relatively free of general wars. The second question regarding Pax Britannica pertains to the Britannica portion of the term: was this peace a British peace? That is, did Great Britain possess power that was dominant and penetrating enough to impose its will in serious diplomatic disputes? And was it therefore able to preserve british power in the early victorian period 3 peace, protect its interests, and deter potential competitors? Most scholars in the past several decades have also answered no to these questions when applied to great power relations. They often acknowledge the relative strength of the Royal Navy and note Britain’s successful “gunboat diplomacy” against smaller states.5 They might recognize Britain’s commercial and industrial superiority and its empire, all of which provided it with resources for a war, especially at sea.6 But most doubt that Britain’s use of naval and military force—or its threat to use force—played any significant role in European affairs, even if it may have helped facilitate peace in the wider world. They instead emphasize that a naval power like Britain could not influence continental powers because it lacked a large army and ultimately needed the help of a continental ally that had one. Continental states were supposedly invulnerable to blockades or cannon fire, much less to mere intimidation by a fleet, because they are assumed to have had expansive armies, internal lines of communication, and self-sufficient economies. So Britain could only interfere from the sidelines, and the peace of Europe instead depended on a European concert.7 Diplomatic histories of the period point to balanceof -power politics in a European system, not naval power, as being...