A Strange and Formidable Weapon: British Responses to World War I Poison Gas

Epilogue

Epilogue Chemical weapons have posed a menace to soldiers and civilians since their inception. The popular dislike of gas in Britain and other countries, which had subsided occasionally during World War I, grew during the interwar period and led to attempts to eradicate the danger from chemical weapons by condemning them and those who would use them. Lord Halsbury, H. G. Wells, and their peers were only the most vocal opponents, and public pressure made it difficult for a government openly to support chemical armaments . The context in which these ideas about chemical weaponry flourished augmented their power and visibility. The interwar period was rife with groups, in Britain and abroad, that worked for arms limitations or pacifist goals and, certainly in Britain, lobbied with humanitarian concerns in mind.1 Organizations whose members feared gas may also have had broader concerns about other weapons, or war as a whole, but even those who focused solely on chemicals overlapped with other groups’ interests; thus, they worked with, rather than against, some of the prevalent trends and debates in British interwar society.2 Several international treaties were designed to ban gas, thus providing additional safeguards against its use. The Treaty of Versailles, ending the war with Germany, prohibited that country’s involvement with gas; the Washington Naval Conference Gas Protocol tried to constrain nations from using chemical weapons; the Geneva Gas Protocol broadened the restrictions by including biological weapons in the ban and binding more countries. Responding to these popular and legal pressures, as well as the need to cut military budgets , the army in Britain reduced research into and training for offensive and defensive gas warfare.3 Practically speaking, public opinion and international treaties clearly lessened the threat of chemical weapons. Yet a fear of gas, emotionally and rationally based, remained in Britain and abroad.4 To those who were rationally and intellectually inclined, although  | Epilogue the treaties offered legal protection against chemical warfare, the documents were riddled with weaknesses. Some were not ratified, and thus not binding ; others had loopholes. The gas protocol drafted at the Washington Naval Conference, for example, never came into force because the submarine treaty to which it was attached was rejected by the French.5 On the other hand, by World War II thirty-nine countries had ratified or acceded to the Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925, but this document lacked enforcement mechanisms (as did most chemical warfare prohibitions), and two of the great powers, the United States and Japan, failed to ratify it.6 Finally, a treaty is only as strong as the signatories’ respect for it. Germany had started the gas war in 1915 by breaking the spirit, if not the letter, of The Hague treaties; why should interwar nations assume that postwar pacts would restrain belligerents from using gas? Diplomats and civilians might have hoped the agreements would be effective, but there was no reason to believe that the treaties, especially weak ones, could absolutely guarantee safety.7 Still, the interwar period was the era of collective security and multinational organizations, such as the League of Nations, and agreements, such as the Locarno Pact, so the drive for multiparty treaties banning gas fit the mood of the time. There were also fears tied to other lessons from World War I. It was obvious that weapons and technology had become increasingly sophisticated during the course of the war. Gas had not been the only new weapon developed; tanks, fighter planes, and flame throwers were others. There was no reason to believe that this trend would not continue during the current peace and any future war. For instance, a popular fear was that the plane and the gas bomb would meld. In Britain, the politician Stanley Baldwin articulated a common concern: “The bomber will always get through.”8 This short statement encapsulated a broader fear; the real dread was that, in the next war, and many believed that there would be another one, unstoppable bombers would target civilians.9 Not only would the planes be impossible to block, but they would cross an ethical and legal line by targeting the home front. These monstrous machines would be armed with gas as well as conventional bombs, which, some worried, would increase their deadliness. Lord Halsbury may have been hyperbolic, but he was not alone in fearing that one gas bomb dropped in central London could destroy an entire neighborhood.10 It was understandable that emotional as well as rational fears about...