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6. The Battle of the Hundred-in-the-Hands
- University of Nebraska Press
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The Battle of the Hundred-in-the-Hands According to Colonel Carrington, between December 6 and December 19, 1866, Indian parties appeared almost daily around the wood party or near the fort, but they did not attack. Inside the compound the residents understood the severity of their situation. By all indications, morale was low and tensions were high. Frances Carrington wrote, “All of us were apprised frankly of the exact state of affairs and assured that there was no immediate danger at the post if all were prudent and avoided gossip and nervous agitation.”1 Capt. Tenodor Ten Eyck’s entries during this two-week period were punctuated with comments such as “all quiet,” “day passed quietly,” and “no Indians.” Despite the danger and vulnerability, teams continued to the pinery, as the post needed to stockpile as much wood as possible before the onset of the harshest months of winter. Carrington doubled the strength of military escorts with the wood trains and attempted to make the best use of his few officers. On December 13, in a decision that illustrates the colonel’s desperate shortage of officers and his obvious disappointment in Ten Eyck’s job performance, Carrington assigned Grummond—who had so egregiously disregarded military protocol just a few days earlier—to replace Ten Eyck as commander of mounted infantry . Fetterman was now in charge of the infantry—the larg- chapter 6 The Battle of the Hundred-in-the-Hands 95 est number of soldiers at the fort—while Grummond led the mounted infantry and Powell replaced Bingham as commander of the cavalry. The three officers drilled their units daily, and the soldiers slept in their clothes, ever ready for a raid or an all-out assault. Everyone at the fort watched Pilot Hill for a sign from the lookouts indicating the arrival of expected reinforcements , but instead the sentry’s flags constantly warned of hostile Indian activity nearby. On December 19, the Pilot Hill pickets signaled that the wood train was corralled and under attack on the way to the pinery. Carrington ordered Captain Powell to take command of a unit to relieve and secure the stranded workers and either bring them back to the fort or escort them on to the pinery. Powell quickly went to the corralled train, relieved it, and brought the workers back without incident, but this day’s events increased in significance after Fetterman’s contingent was annihilated two days later. After the train was safely returned, Carrington sent a telegram to department headquarters stating, “No special news since last report. Indians appeared to-day and fired on wood train but were repulsed. They are accomplishing nothing, while I am perfecting all details of the post and preparing for active movements.”2 This cavalier dispatch, typical of Carrington’s messages focusing on any minor success, would come back to haunt Carrington during the weeks after the Fetterman incident when the colonel sought to prove the lack of support he received from army headquarters. Cooke used this telegram to prove to Sherman and Grant that “two days before the massacre . . . [Carrington] felt strong enough to take the offensive.”3 Two days later, when the Fetterman disaster unfolded, Carrington had not yet submitted an official report on the events of December 19. It is not clear whether Carrington even planned to write a detailed report on Powell’s mission or to elaborate on the telegraph that was meant to assure his superiors that he was under control and about to take offensive action. However, in his report on the Fetterman fight, Carrington went into great detail about the incident of December 19, claiming Powell’s suc- [44.200.101.170] Project MUSE (2024-03-29 03:26 GMT) The Battle of the Hundred-in-the-Hands 96 cessful return was the result of strict adherence to Carrington’s orders and implying that Fetterman disobeyed this same command two days later. In his testimony before the investigating commission after the Fetterman Massacre, Carrington testified that “[Powell] did his work—pressed the Indians towards Lodge Trail Ridge, but having peremptory orders not to cross it, he returned with the train, reporting the Indians in large force, and that if he had crossed the ridge he never would have come back with his command.”4 Powell was subsequently interrogated about the events of December 19 when he testified before the Fetterman investigation commission. He did not mention Carrington’s supposed order...