Andean Tragedy: Fighting the War of the Pacific, 1879-1884

7. The Tacna and Arica Campaigns

7. The Tacna and Arica Campaigns T he surrender of Tarapacá Province only briefly appeased Chile’s war hawks, who demanded that the army continue northward. Alas, much as it might wish, the high command could not respond immediately: the Tarapacá campaign had pruned the army’s ranks, consumed its supplies, equipment, clothing, footwear, and transport, while revealing flaws in the newly created supply and medical services. Thus, before the military could launch another offensive, it needed to find fresh recruits, restock its supply depots, and purchase new equipment as well as transport, including three to four thousand pack mules. It also had to reorganize the army’s technical branches, particularly the medical corps. Thus, while the army restored itself, the country’s civilian and military leaders pondered their options.1 The Aníbal Pinto government considered two possible targets: Lima, Peru’s capital, or Arica, its most important port south of Callao. Given the existence of numerous possible landing sites, as well as their access to the sea, and thus the support of the fleet’s big guns, Gen. Erasmo Escala advocated assaulting Lima. Rafael Sotomayor, however, raised a criticism that even Escala acknowledged as valid: besieging Peru’s capital without first eradicating Arica’s garrison would expose the Chilean rear to an Allied army that could attack the recently captured Tarapacá. Other government advisers concurred, warning that an enemy presence in Arica threatened Chilean supply lines. Conversely, capturing this harbor guaranteed Chile’s access to an adequate supply of water and forage while allowing it to threaten the enemy ’s supply lines to the troops stationed in the highland cities of the tacna and arica campaigns 213 Arequipa and Moquegua. Once seized, moreover, the Chileans might offer to cede Arica to Bolivia in return for its promise to end its participation in the war. But assaulting Arica also had its drawbacks: the Peruvians had built numerous coastal strong points to defend the harbor. And rising more than 670 feet above the oceanfront loomed El Morro, a slab of mountain atop which stood various forts mounting heavy artillery with a clear view of the sea. Anchored below, the Peruvian monitor Manco Cápac still remained on guard. Obviously an amphibious landing on the port itself would have been costly, if not suicidal. If the Chilean military hoped to capture what Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna called “the Sebastapol of the Pacific,” it would first have to land its army elsewhere, then move the troops, their artillery, and supplies overland in order to assail the strategically important fortress from the east, not unlike what the Japanese did to Singapore in 1942.2 Eventually a council of war selected Ilo, a port approximately seventy miles to the north of Arica, as its invasion site. But before it could strike north, the army had to amass supplies and manpower ; it also had to coordinate its plans with Chile’s navy to procure the shipping, to transport its units to Ilo, and to protect them en route from the remnants of Peru’s fleet. Once these tasks were complete, Chile’s army would be ready to attack Tacna and Arica, thus moving closer to its ultimate destination: Lima. Blockading Peru’s Coast As of October 1879, Peru’s navy consisted of two monitors and a few torpedo boats, none of which dared venture into the open sea. Only the oceangoing Unión could still cause substantial mischief. Rather than prowl the sea-lanes in search of the enemy corvette, the Pinto government decided to order its ships to close Peru’s ports. By effectively entombing the Unión, the Chileans could, moreover, curtail, if not completely stop, Peru’s importation of needed war materiel.3 Thus, by November 1879 the Cochrane, the Covadonga, and the Magallanes were already blockading Iquique and Mollendo while watching over the less important harbors of Chucumata and Patillos. Following Iquique’s capture, the Chileans shifted their focus to the north, quarantining the ports north of Pisagua 214 the tacna and arica campaigns and south of Callao. (The Chilean fleet still needed to patrol Iquique and Pisagua for fear that the Unión might attack these undefended places. Hence, the Abtao remained off Pisagua and the Magallanes off Iquique until these coastal cities possessed enough artillery or mines to defend themselves.)4 On 28 November the Chacabuco, the O’Higgins, and the Magallanes sailed into...