The French Navy and the Seven Years' War

1748-1754 An Uneasy Peace

BOB — University of Nebraska Press / Page 1 / / French Navy and the Seven YearS’ War / Jonathan R. Dull 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 [First Page] [1], (1) Lines: 0 to 20 ——— 2.71pt PgVar ——— Normal Page PgEnds: TEX [1], (1) 1 1748-1754 An Uneasy Peace the war of the austrian succession and the decline of franco-british relations As the eighteenth century reached its midpoint, the governments of France and Great Britain viewed each other with suspicion. For example, Thomas PelhamHolles , Duke of Newcastle, one of the two British secretaries of state and, after 1754, prime minister, considered the two states as inveterate rivals, if not quite inevitable enemies.1 Historians generally treat this animosity as one of the few constants during this century of shifting alliances.2 Indeed, British-French relations between 1688 and 1815 have been described as a “Second Hundred Years’ War.”3 On the surface this comparison to the Hundred Years’ War of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries seems plausible. Between the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the Battle of Waterloo, Britain and France fought seven wars; hostilities occurred in some 60 of the 127 years. Significant differences, however, existed between this period of frequent conflict and its predecessor. Although what medieval historians call the HundredYears’War was punctuated by periods of peace, it essentially was a single war with a common cause, the irreconcilable dynastic claims of the English and French ruling houses. The so-called Second Hundred Years’ War was far more complex. Some historians argue it had an underlying cause, colonial rivalry, particularly the battle for supremacy over the balance of power in America.4 This, however, overstates the importance of American affairs. Over the course of the eighteenth century, the English public and the British Parliament took an increasing interest in the Western Hemisphere,5 but even at the height of the War of the Austrian Succession (in which Britain participated from 1742 to 1748) elections to the House of Commons were dominated by local issues.6 Most Frenchmen generally had scant interest in the rich sugar-producing islands of the Caribbean, let alone the BOB — University of Nebraska Press / Page 2 / / French Navy and the Seven YearS’ War / Jonathan R. Dull 2 An Uneasy Peace 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 [2], (2) Lines: 20 to 26 ——— 0.0pt PgVar ——— Normal Page PgEnds: TEX [2], (2) North American mainland, which produced little of any interest to them except tobacco (and, for the better off, furs).7 The French and British monarchs of the period usually showed a far greater interest in European affairs than in American . This was especially true during the reigns in Britain of George I (1714–27) and George II (1727–60), who were obsessed with the north German electorate of Hanover, which they also ruled. Newcastle may have believed the American balance of power could decisively affect the balance of power in Europe,8 but in 1755 his French counterpart questioned whether colonial issues were sufficient cause for war.9 If not the rivalry to gain colonies, what accounts for the nearly continuous suspicion and frequent hostility between Britain and France? At times Britain feared a French threat to its system of government, as in the 1740s when France supported the restoration of the Stuart dynasty or in the 1790s when Britain feared French revolutionaries. More often, however, the friction between the two powers was based on geopolitical factors, such as rivalry in the Mediterranean or in the Baltic, a region that supplied timber and masts for the navies of both Britain and France. The most serious source of reciprocal concern was the area along France’s northern border, the provinces of the southern Netherlands (today’s Belgium), which were ruled until 1714 by Spain and thereafter by Austria . These provinces could form a staging area for the invasion of France as they did in both the first and the last decades of the eighteenth century. Conversely this area could provide ports to assemble a flotilla to invade the vulnerable eastern coasts of England and...