The Absence of Grand Strategy: The United States in the Persian Gulf, 1972–2005

4. The Bush Administration and Constructive Engagement

c h a p t e r f o u r The Bush Administration and Constructive Engagement At the extremes, states can placate or confront other states in the effort to get them to do something that they otherwise would not do—the classic definition of a power or influence. Placating others can be a sensible strategy if it achieves this goal, but it can fail and simply strengthen the strongest actor. That is roughly what occurred in American foreign policy toward Iraq from 1988 until Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. After the Iran-Iraq War, the United States tried to alter Iraq’s behavior with a strategy that leaned strongly toward placating it in the hope of co-opting it. Iraq’s bellicose and threatening behavior after the war was not met by a change in U.S. strategy toward balancing but rather the opposite. Episode 5: Constructive Engagement, 1988–1990 At the outset of its tenure in 1989, the administration of George H. W. Bush reviewed previous U.S. policies in the Persian Gulf and decided in what was called National Security Review 10 not to shift away from the policy of tilting in Iraq’s direction. Rather, it adopted a policy of ‘‘constructive engagement.’’ It was motivated by the fact that Iraq, as one official put it, emerged from the war as the 66 The Absence of Grand Strategy ‘‘most powerful country in a key part of the world’’ for the United States, and so the ‘‘feeling at the time’’ was that the United States needed to ‘‘develop a workable relationship with Saddam Hussein.’’∞ Based partly on this logic, National Security Review 10 recommended that the United States use various economic and political inducements to alter Iraq’s behavior.≤ These recommendations were formally adopted by President Bush in National Security Directive 26 in October 1989.≥ The U.S. policy of constructive engagement did not work as anticipated. Not only did the United States fail to achieve a workable relationship with Iraq, but Saddam became increasingly aggressive from 1988 to 1990. It is important to understand that Iraq was far stronger and more threatening than Iran during this time period and that key American officials fully understood this. Although it may have been hard to balance with Iran against Iraq, given difficult relations with Tehran, it certainly was possible to decrease support for Iraq, to move toward less accommodation and more containment. Thus, the option of engaging in greater balancing behavior was available but not pursued. Iraq Gains the Upper Hand in the Balance of Power Iraq had grown immensely in military capability during the Iran-Iraq War, although it did not actually achieve its war objectives. States around the world wanted Iraq to be strong enough to deter Iran, which appeared more threatening than Iraq most of the time. They were concerned that Iran, infused with the outsized revolutionary zeal of Ayatollah Khomeini and his ardent followers, could win the war, so they took some steps to weaken it beyond the U.S. sanctions that were slapped on Iran during the hostage crisis of 1979 and in the 1980s. States were also driven to support Iraq by the profit motive. The Soviet Union and France in particular became Iraq’s number 1 and 2 arms suppliers, respectively . Iraq, thus, obtained a variety of arms and other military items during the war. By the end of the war, the American, Western, and Arab tilt toward Iraq and against Iran, as well as the effects of war, had weakened Iran compared with Iraq (table 4). Kenneth Pollack, who served as a CIA analyst in this period, asserts that he and his colleagues were concerned about this imbalance and about the possibility that ‘‘the devastation of Iranian military power meant that, for the first time, Iraq was effectively unrestrained in how it could pursue its regional ambitions.’’∂ The Bush Administration and Constructive Engagement 67 Table 4. The Military Balance, 1980–1992 Total Mena Armyb Tanks Combat Aircraft ∞Ω∫≠ (At the outset of the Iran-Iraq War) Iran Iraq ≤∂≠,≠≠≠ ≤∂≥,≠≠≠ ∞∑≠,≠≠≠ ≤≠≠,≠≠≠ ∞,π≥∑ ≤,π∑≠ ∂∂π ≥≥Ω ∞Ω∫≥ (Coincident with Operation Staunch) Iran Iraq ≤≥∑,≠≠≠ ≥∂≤,≠≠≠ ∞∑≠,≠≠≠ ≥≠≠,≠≠≠ ∞,≤∞≠ ≤,≥≠≠ Ω≠ ≥≥≠ ∞Ω∫∑ (Concomitant with the Iran-Contra affair) Iran Iraq ∑∑∑,≠≠≠ ∏∂≤,≠≠≠ ≤∑≠,≠≠≠ ∏≠≠,≠≠≠ ∞,≠≠≠ ≤,Ω≠≠ Ω∑ ∑∫≠ ∞Ω∫π (During the reflagging mission) Iran Iraq ∏∂∑,≠≠≠ ∞,≠≠≠,≠≠≠ ≥≠∑,≠≠≠ Ω∑∑,≠≠≠ ∞,≠≠≠ ∂,∑≠≠ ∏≠–∞∏≠ ∑≠≠–∫≠≠ ∞ΩΩ≠ (Prior to Iraq’s August ≤ invasion of Kuwait) Iran Iraq ∑≠∂,≠≠≠ ∞,≠≠≠,≠≠≠ ≥≠∑,≠≠≠ Ω∑∑,≠≠≠ ∑≠≠ ∑,∑≠≠ ∞∫∑ ∏∫Ω ∞ΩΩ≤ (At start of dual containment) Iran Iraq ∏≠≠,≠≠≠–π∑≠,≠≠≠ ∏≠≠,≠≠≠–∫≠≠,≠≠≠ ∑≠≠,≠≠≠–∑≥≠,≠≠≠ ∂≠≠,≠≠≠–∑≠≠,≠≠≠ π≠≠–∫≠≠ ≤,Ω≠≠–≥,∞≠≠ ≤≠≠–≤≥≠c ≥≥≠–≥∏≠ Sources: Off-the-record interviews; U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf...