The Absence of Grand Strategy: The United States in the Persian Gulf, 1972–2005

2. The Nixon Administration’s Twin Pillars

c h a p t e r t w o The Nixon Administration’s Twin Pillars The Persian Gulf rose in importance in great-power jockeying during the two world wars of the twentieth century. But it was really after the discovery and large-scale development of oil, chiefly after World War II, that it gained larger global economic prominence. Indeed, the United States started to take stock of Saudi oil not only as an economic resource but also because it could serve as a potential weapon of power by Moscow, whose troops had not yet withdrawn from Iranian Azerbaijan, despite the war’s end and Moscow’s promises to do so. With this concern in mind, President Harry S Truman approved the completion of the air base at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, on September 28, 1945, thus launching the U.S.-Saudi strategic relationship in earnest. The United States was formally committed to Saudi security at least as early as 1947 when Truman and King Ibn Saud made a pact, described in a State Department cable, which pledged that if Saudi Arabia was attacked by another power or under threat of attack, Washington would take ‘‘energetic measures under the auspices of the United Nations to confront such aggression.’’∞ Yet even after World War II, the region remained on the sidelines of global politics, submerged The Nixon Administration’s Twin Pillars 29 under the more pressing realities of the Cold War. It would take revolution, wars, and terrorism over the next three decades to bring it front and center. This chapter begins by sketching Moscow’s rising profile in the region in the 1970s and analyzing the region’s balance of power. It then discusses the Nixon administration’s twin pillar policy and explains its importance in U.S. strategy in the region. In doing so, this chapter also provides some background that will help in understanding subsequent American behavior in the region. In brief, the United States clearly balanced against power at the global level in the 1970s. It was fundamentally focused on balancing against the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and thus it balanced against Iraq. Washington also balanced against threat in the region because it saw Iraq as far more threatening than any other state in the Persian Gulf, largely because it was aligned, even if uneasily, with Moscow. It is less clear, however, that the United States balanced against power in the region. This is because Iran was stronger than Iraq during this time. Global imperatives to balance against power took precedence over balancing against power at the regional level. The British Withdrawal from East of Suez Serious American involvement in the Persian Gulf is relatively recent. Britain, not the United States, had military predominance in the Persian Gulf in the post–World War II period. This changed in 1968 when, to America’s chagrin, Britain announced that it would withdraw from the area east of Suez, a withdrawal it completed by 1971. The withdrawal was motivated by a number of possible factors, including Arab nationalist challenges, rising American strength, and flagging British strategic and economic capabilities.≤ By 1971, Washington had assumed the responsibility for the defense of Western strategic interests in the Persian Gulf, with Britain playing only a minor role. British withdrawal left a temporary power vacuum in the region which had to be filled. For decades Britain’s hegemony over the Gulf decreased adventurism by regional and global powers. Britain enjoyed military predominance at sea and a monopoly of political control in the region. Others could not sensibly challenge the British position. After Britain withdrew, smaller Gulf states became more vulnerable to the larger ones. Indeed, as a harbinger of ensuing events, Iraq threatened to occupy parts of Kuwait one week after Britain withdrew its forces. At the global level, the 30 The Absence of Grand Strategy British departure presaged increased global rivalry, which would fluctuate in intensity, alter the nature of regional interaction, and further complicate the international politics of the Gulf until the Soviet Union’s demise. Britain’s departure strengthened America’s influence in the Gulf and heightened the Soviet Union’s fears that Washington would either seize control of Gulf oil or use the region to undermine Soviet security. In particular, on April 9, 1972, the Soviet Union and Iraq signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which provided for the qualified Soviet...