Index Abqaiq-Yanbu pipeline, 97 Abu Musa, and row with Iran, 96–97 active balancing, testing for, 23–27 Afghanistan, 152; Soviet invasion of, 46 Ajami, Fouad, 155 Albright, Madeleine: adopting dual containment , 99; on democratization, 124; on Saddam’s defiance of UN resolutions and U.S. response, 110–11 Al Qaeda: and alleged ties to Saddam, 121, 124; and balance-of-power theory, 184– 85; lack of soft power, 157–58; and Condoleezza Rice, 122; Saudi public support of, 139; terrorism in Saudi Arabia, 160; on supposed oil-stealing Americans, 128–29; U.S. approach before and after 9/11, 121– 23 Arab oil embargo, 13; and Iran’s non-role, 34 Arafat, Yasser, 81 Art, Robert, 8, 91; identifies eight grand strategies, 173 asymmetric warfare, 156–57 AWACS, 35, 176 ‘‘axis of evil’’ speech, 121, 135 Aziz, Tariq: justifying Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, 77–78; and Saddam’s rising power, 49–50 Baath Party, and Saddam’s rule, 77 Bahrain, and fear of Iranian revolution, 37 Baker, James: view of Saddam Hussein in 1989–90, 70–71; on war termination in 1991, 88 Bakhash, Shaul, 74 balance-of-power policy: as commonly invoked, 2–3; decline of, 5–6, 147–64; vs. dual containment policy as approach, 104; implications of findings for other regions, 183–84; in 19th century Europe, 161; non-role of individuals, 171–72; vs. preemption , 146–47; vs. regime change as policy, 112–13; results of testing, 167–68; as theory of foreign policy, 185–86 balance-of-power theory: assumptions of, 3– 4; vs. bandwagoning, 1; vs. collective security, 83–85; vs. hegemony, 7–12; offshore balancing, 7–12; testing for, 23–27; traditional, 184–87 balance-of-threat theory, 2; balance-ofthreat policy as part of reactive engagement , 196; results of testing balance-ofthreat policy, 168–69 Barnett, Thomas, 179 Bazoft, Farzad, 68 benign neglect, 50 Berger, Samuel, on move toward regime change policy in Iraq, 111 Berlin Wall, 70 ‘‘black box,’’ 197 Blair, Tony, 122 Blix, Hans, mixed reports on Iraq’s compliance , 118 Boland Amendment, and Iran-Contra, 53 Britain: and historic external balancing role in Europe, 29–30, 32; withdrawal from Persian Gulf, 29–30 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 188 Bush, George H. W.: and accommodating Saddam in 1980s, 65–66, 71, 101; compared to son, 124, 132–33, 155; and UN in 1990 Gulf crisis, 87 246 Index Bush, George W.: and Bush doctrine of preemption , 124–26; decline of balance-ofpower policy, 6; and notion of ‘‘crusade,’’ 133–34; policies compared to Richard Nixon’s, 164–65; regime change by use of force, 115, 124–26; and 2002 speech to UN, 117; 2002 State of the Union speech, 126 Butler, Richard, 108 Buzan, Barry, and regional analysis, 19–20 Camp David Accords, isolating Egypt, 39– 40 Carter, Jimmy: vs. balance-of-power policy, 35; and Iranian revolution, 43–44; moralist foreign policy, 35; and sanctions against Iran, 99 Carter Doctrine, 46 Cato Institute, 13–14 CENTCOM, 161 Central Intelligence Agency: and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, 81; seeking to overthrow Saddam, 102 Cheney, Richard, 88; connecting Iraq to terrorism , 122; impact of September 11 on, 121; oil interests, 131; power in White House, 133; pushing war with Iraq, 122; and value of preemption policy, 121 China: and postwar Iran, 96; and Silkworm missiles, 61; view of UN Resolution 1284, 112 Christopher, Warren, 98; and Iranian hostage crisis, 104, 172 Clarke, Jonathan, 162 Clarke, Richard, memo on Al Qaeda threat, 122 Clemenceau, Georges, 84 Clinton, William Jefferson: dual containment policy, 99–102; view of balance-ofpower policy, 114; view of Iran, 98 Cold War, end of, 147–51 collective security: after Cold War, 152; in 1991 Gulf crisis; 85–87; and World War I, 83. See also balance-of-power theory Commodities Credit Corporation, and U.S. support of Saddam Hussein, 52, 71 constructive engagement: Iraq more threatening than Iran, 67–71, 73–74; not balancing vs. threat or power, 74–75; reasoning behind policy, 70–71; tilting in Iraq’s direction, 1988–90, 65–66 containment-plus: Iraqi defiance and adoption of, 109–10; France and Russia uncooperative, 108–9, 112; moving away from dual containment, 106–10; regime change policy as part of, 110–12; UN oilfor -food scandal, 107; view that UN sanctions faltered, 108 Contra rebels, and Iran-Contra affair, 54– 55, 59 David, Steven, 15 democratization: vs. balance-of-power policy , 157; as goal for Iraq, 123–24, 143, 180 d...