Notes
Notes Abbreviations Used in the Notes and Bibliography CDSP Current Digest of the Soviet Press CIA U.S. Central Intelligence Agency CRS Congressional Research Service DSR Declassified, U.S. Department of State EO Systematic Review ( June 30, 2005), National Archives FBIS Foreign Broadcast Information Service GBPL George Bush Presidential Library, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas GPO Government Publishing Office JPRS Joint Publications Research Service MEA Middle East and Africa MECS Middle East Contemporary Survey MEED Middle East Economic Digest MEES Middle East Economic Survey NA National Archives NENA Near East and North Africa NESA Near East and South Asia NIC National Intelligence Council NIE National Intelligence Estimate NSA National Security Archive, Washington, D.C. NSC National Security Council NSDD National Security Decision Directive introduction: No Grand Strategy 1. For a brief discussion of the literature on bandwagoning, see Schweller, ‘‘Bandwagoning for Profit,’’ 72–74. 2. Because the weaker side has more need for assistance, new members can increase their influence much more by joining it instead of the stronger side and can reap more gains because the weaker side will value their support more. Walt, Origins of Alliances, 18–19. 3. Taliaferro, Balancing Risks, 228. For an overview of the variants of realism, see Taliaferro, ‘‘Security Seeking under Anarchy,’’ 132–35. 4. See Layne, Peace of Illusions, esp. 19. Indeed, this claim is sometimes made even 202 Notes to Pages 2–7 regarding structural realism. See Elman, ‘‘Horses for Courses,’’ 10–11. See also Layne, Peace of Illusions, esp. 19. 5. Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, 11. 6. Robert Art identifies eight strategies: dominion aims, to rule the world; global collective security, to keep peace everywhere; regional collective security, to keep the peace in some places; cooperative security, to reduce the occurrence of war by limiting the offensive military capabilities of states; containment, to hold the line against a specific aggressor state; offshore balancing, to do that and, in addition, to cut down any emerging Eurasian hegemon; and selective engagement, to do a selected number of critical tasks. Art, Grand Strategy for America, chap. 3. See Layne, Peace of Illusions, chap. 8, on the differences between hegemony, offshore balancing, and selective engagement. On various grand strategies, see Kupchan, Vulnerability of Empire. For a good discussion of how to define grand strategy and for an analysis of what the author considers to be the four main grand strategies—strategic disengagement, balance of power, primacy, and liberal internationalism—see Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, chaps. 1 and 5. On definitions, see Kennedy, Grand Strategies in War and Peace, 2–4. In addition, see Lieber, Eagle without a Cause. For an analysis of various grand strategies, see Posen and Ross, ‘‘Competing U.S. Grand Strategies.’’ 7. Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, 11. On the need for American grand strategy in the post– 9/11 world, see Lieber, American Era. 8. See Barylski, ‘‘Collapse of the Soviet Union,’’ 98; on Central America, Walt, Origins of Alliances, 23; on Europe, Khalilzad, ‘‘Losing the Moment’’; and on Asia broadly, Ott, ‘‘Dragon’s Reach,’’ 118–26. 9. Betts, ‘‘Wealth, Power, and Instability,’’ 34–77. See also Perlez, ‘‘U.S. Competes with China.’’ 10. Thomas, ‘‘South Asian Security Balance,’’ 305. 11. See, for instance, Indyk et al., ‘‘Symposium on Dual Containment,’’ 2, and Lake, ‘‘Confronting Backlash States,’’ esp. 48–50. 12. Telhami, ‘‘Are We Stuck in Iraq?’’ 13. For instance, Said, ‘‘Potential Egyptian Contribution.’’ On the Bush Doctrine, see Monten, ‘‘Roots of the Bush Doctrine.’’ 14. Russell, ‘‘Persian Gulf’s Collective Security Mirage,’’ 77. 15. Ibid., 82. 16. These actions capture roughly what this book means by balance-of-power behavior for an external actor. However, many different definitions of balance of power exist. Ernst Haas discovered eight different meanings of this concept; Martin Wight found nine. Haas, ‘‘Balance of Power,’’ 442–77; Wight, ‘‘Balance of Power.’’ 17. See Halper and Clarke, America Alone, 76–77. 18. See n. 6 above. 19. Layne, Peace of Illusions, 5. 20. Ibid., 178–79. 21. For Mearsheimer, the offshore balancer tends to focus more on how great powers will try to prevent other great powers from becoming hegemons in distant regions and less so on how great powers will prevent rising states within distant regions from gaining power. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics. 22. On the differences between these schools of realism, see Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Wohlforth, Elusive Balance. On the United States as an offshore bal- [18.188.108.54] Project MUSE (2024...
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