The Absence of Grand Strategy: The United States in the Persian Gulf, 1972–2005

11. Theory, Strategy, and Realism

c h a p t e r e l e v e n Theory, Strategy, and Realism Like all great powers in history, the United States has sought to secure and advance its interests in faraway regions. It has been slowly drawn into these regions and particularly into Middle East politics in the past two decades. American security became inextricably linked to events in the Persian Gulf, largely because the United States and the entire global economy had become dependent on oil. And the United States and its role in the region morphed, as did our view of its role and of the region itself. In pursuing its interests in the region, Washington used a plethora of approaches that have changed over time as a result of domestic, regional, and international developments. Exploring the American experience in the Persian Gulf offers a long and panoramic view that would not be apparent in examining just one case or time period. We can see not only that the United States did not practice balance-ofpower policy much but that balance of power decreased in prominence in U.S. foreign policy. But these findings leave open broader questions. This chapter is devoted to three theory-oriented questions. If the United States did not engage much in balancing against power, either as an active or offshore balancer, and if it did so increasingly less over time, is this likely to be the case in other regions as Theory, Strategy, and Realism 183 well? Does this book suggest a problem with balance-of-power theory writ large? If the United States did balance against threat much more than against power but sometimes did not balance against threat, under what conditions did it balance or not balance against threat? Broader Significance for Other Regions? Regions are complex and varied, and it is challenging to treat them in similar ways. Yet the notion that the United States practiced balance-of-power policy less over time in the Persian Gulf is meaningful. It should lead us to wonder whether this outcome is also more broadly relevant. The developments that contributed to the decline in American balancing in the Persian Gulf may not be limited to the U.S. role there. Transnational terrorism by nature affects and infects all regions, and neither the consequences of the end of the Cold War nor the rise of American power can be confined to one region. It follows that if these developments have made the United States less likely to act as an active balancer in the Persian Gulf, they may do so in other regions as well, although at varying levels as a function of regional politics and the extent to which these developments are salient in each region. Of course, one could argue that these developments will be reversed over time. Such reversal is possible but does not seem likely in the near term at least. Moscow altogether cannot reconstitute the empire, even though President Vladimir Putin has displayed authoritarian tendencies, and U.S.-Russian tensions could arise again in serious ways. In the Middle East, the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 altered Moscow’s military and political role. Moscow no longer supports radical Arab states with military arms and economic aid. Russian advisers are not involved in the region’s various conflicts. Moscow has become far less likely, willing, and able to engage in activity that could directly or indirectly challenge regional stability. Of course, important elements in Russia’s foreign policy establishment have continued to view U.S.-Russian interaction as a power struggle, and President Vladimir Putin has shown some signs of reverting to Cold War behavior, but Moscow’s tendency to rival the United States has been tempered and its inclination to cooperate increased.∞ The rise of American capability can be reversed, although that does not appear likely in the near term. It takes time in world politics for a shift of that magnitude. Some scholars argue, in fact, that there are several facets of the American unipolar order, including technological dominance and democratic 184 The Absence of Grand Strategy principles, which not only make it durable but even expansive.≤ Although this argument is not clear, the gap between the United States and its competitors is vast. Transnational terrorism as well may ebb in importance, but for the foreseeable future it seems to be a significant fixture on...