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The 1982 Falklands War seems to offer strong support for the triumphalists’ view that democracies enjoy an advantage over nondemocracies when they meet on the battlefield. On April 2, 1982, the Argentine military junta sent its armed forces to invade the Islas Malvinas in an effort to assert Argentine sovereignty. But by June 6, 1982, the Argentine garrison on the islands surrendered to a British task force sent to retake the Falkland Islands. The democratic United Kingdom, with fewer troops, comparable weapons and technology, and fighting nearly 8,000 miles from home, nonetheless decisively defeated military-ruled Argentina.1 As then U.S. secretary of state Alexander Haig remarked with respect to Britain’s victory, “The British demonstrated that a free people have not only kept a sinewy grip on the values they seem to take for granted, but are willing to fight for them, and to fight supremely well against considerable odds.”2 Many scholars concurred with this assessment. “A military challenge such as this cannot but be a critical test for the presiding political system,” Britain’s official historian of the war, Sir Lawrence Freedman, observed, and its “eventual success in retrieving the islands was then held to reflect well on the political system.”3 The Falklands War certainly appears, at first glance, to be another prime example of a democracy ’s advantage over an autocracy during war. Moreover, the war seems also to demonstrate that the various mechanisms advanced by triumphalists to explain why democracies should have a military advantage over nondemocracies operate as specified. The Falklands War, for example, seems to support that part of the triumphalists’ selection effects argument that holds that the fate of leaders is inextricably linked to success in war. c h a p t e r 5 Democracy and Britain’s Victory in the Falklands War According to a Liberal member of Parliament, “The facts speak for themselves. After unsuccessful foreign ventures, prime ministers have been replaced.”4 In Britain, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s decisive victory in the war apparently arrested the precipitous decline in her public approval rating and ensured her reelection the following year. Conversely, in Argentina the defeat sealed the fate of General Leopoldo Galtieri and his colleagues on the ruling military junta, who lost power soon after launching the ill-fated expedition. The Falklands War also provides some evidence that democracies enjoy advantages over nondemocracies once the war has begun. This case seems to vindicate , for instance, the triumphalists’ claims that democracies can count on a greater level of commitment from their democratic allies than nondemocracies can. In particular, the claim that audience costs in democracies make democratic alliances stronger and more durable seems to find some support. As Haig recalled cautioning General Leopoldo Galtieri early in the conflict, “In the United States, the support for Britain is widespread. In the liberal world sentiment is overwhelmingly in favor of Great Britain and would remain so if it comes to a confrontation.”5 The British secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs, Francis Pym, similarly recollected that “I was greatly encouraged by the support that I encountered for Britain during my visit to the United States of America. The Americans are well aware that Argentina is the aggressor in this dispute and I imagine that they are greatly influenced by the ties of history and the shared ideals of freedom and democracy that link their country to ours. I have no doubt these are some reasons why public opinion polls in American have shown such solid support for the United Kingdom.”6 In contrast, despite Argentine beliefs to the contrary based on private assurances from Reagan’s ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, the United States did not support the junta against Great Britain. In addition, the Falklands case also seems to support the triumphalists’ view that democracies are better at strategic evaluation than nondemocracies. One member of Parliament remarked in the House of Commons that “If the Argentines believed that their aggression would present Her Majesty’s Government with a fait accompli to which they would not react, clearly they have sadly misjudged the reaction of a democratic Government who have responsibilities that they intend to carry out for the sovereign parts of their territory. Perhaps all dictatorships are likely to make such a mistake, so no one should be surprised.”7 Conversely, democratic Britain appeared to have made all the right strategic decisions...

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