Dual Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Institutionalized Regimes in Chile and Mexico, 1970–2000

Notes

n o t e s Introduction 1. Karatnycky, ‘‘1999 Freedom House Survey,’’ 187–200. 2. See Huntington, Third Wave. 3. Diamond and Plattner, eds., Economic Reform and Democracy, ix. 4. Haggard and Kaufman, eds., Politics of Economic Adjustment, 3. 5. Przeworski, States and Markets, chs. 2 and 4. 6. Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins, chs. 5 and 6. 7. See Moore Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy; and Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions. 8. On centralized and decentralized mechanisms for allocating resources, see Przeworski , States and Markets, sections 1 and 2. 9. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, 170–3, 193–5. 10. See Williamson, ed., Political Economy of Policy Reform. 11. See O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism. 12. See Lipset, ‘‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy.’’ 13. See Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, eds., Comparative Historical Analysis. 14. See Stokes, Mandates and Democracy; Stokes, ed., Public Support for Market Reforms; and Weyland, Politics of Market Reform. 15. Haggard and Kaufman, eds., Politics of Economic Adjustment, 174–82; and Valenzuela , ‘‘Latin American Presidencies Interrupted,’’ 5–19. 16. Relevant works include Haggard and Kaufman, eds., Politics of Economic Adjustment; various authors, ‘‘Economic Liberalization and Democratization’’; Haggard and Webb, eds., Voting for Reform; Bermeo, ‘‘Sacrifice, Sequence, and Strength,’’ 601–27; Joan M. Nelson et al., Intricate Links; Armijo, ed., ‘‘Conversations on Democratization and Economic Reform’’; Lawson, ‘‘Conference Report’’; Encarnación, ‘‘Politics of Dual Transitions ’’; Oxhorn and Starr, eds., Markets and Democracy in Latin America; and Halperin, Siegle, and Weinstein, Democracy Advantage. 17. See Desai, Perestroika in Perspective; Lal, Poverty of Development Economics; and Pei, ‘‘Puzzle of East Asian Exceptionalism.’’ 230 Notes to Pages 8–15 18. Maravall, ‘‘Myth of the Authoritarian Advantage’’; Geddes, ‘‘Challenging the Conventional Wisdom’’; and Halperin, Siegle, and Weinstein, Democracy Advantage. 19. See Haggard and Kaufman, Political Economy of Democratic Transitions. 20. Bates and Krueger, eds., Political and Economic Interactions, 4. 21. Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy, 5–7. 22. Przeworski et al., Sustainable Democracy, 10–6. 23. Huntington, Political Order, 12, 1. 24. Linz, ‘‘Future of an Authoritarian Situation,’’ 233–54. 25. Mainwaring and Scully, eds., Building Democratic Institutions, 4. 26. See O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies; and Colomer, Game Theory. 27. Linz, ‘‘Future of an Authoritarian Situation,’’ 236. 28. Kurtz, Free Market Democracy, 5, 250–1. 29. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, 170. 30. For example, Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy; Haggard and Kaufman, eds., Politics of Economic Adjustment; and Haggard and Kaufman, Political Economy of Democratic Transitions. 31. Rustow, ‘‘Transitions to Democracy,’’ 337–63; O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy; Diamond, Hartlyn, Linz, and Lipset, eds., Democracy in Developing Countries; and Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. 32. International: Whitehead, ed., International Dimensions of Democratization, 3–53. State: Elster and Slagstad, eds., Constitutionalism and Democracy, 1–17; see also Méndez, O’Donnell, and Pinheiro, eds., (Un)Rule of Law. Regime: O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, 73; Haggard and Kaufman, Political Economy of Democratic Transitions, 7–16; and Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation , 38–54; see also Geddes, Politician’s Dilemma. Organized interests: Bates and Krueger, eds., Political and Economic Interactions, 460–2; and Haggard and Kaufman, Political Economy of Democratic Transitions, 7–16. Civil society: Cohen and Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory, 29–82; Diamond, ed., Political Culture and Democracy; Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 7–10; and Oxhorn and Starr, eds., Markets and Democracy in Latin America, 5–13. Individual actors: Powell, El piloto del cambio; and Brown, Gorbachev Factor. 33. Bhagwati, ‘‘Democracy and Development,’’ 33–5. 34. Peters, Comparative Politics, 37–41; and Przeworski and Teune, Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry, 34–9. 35. Sexenio refers to the six years that the presidential term lasts in Mexico. End-of-sexenio crises were those that occurred in the last year of presidential terms (1976, 1982, 1987– 88, 1994–95). Notes to Pages 19–29 231 1. Chile 1. Pinto, Chile, hoy, 5. 2. IMF, International Financial Statistics, 1985. 3. See Gazmuri, Arancibia, and Góngora, Eduardo Frei Montalva. 4. See Considine, ed., Social Revolution in the New Latin America. 5. For an assessment of the Marxist left’s self-perception in those years, see Corvalán, De...