Notes
Notes Introduction 1. The post-1958 political regime is known popularly by the name of the house (Puntofijo) in which Venezuela’s previously antagonistic elites reached agreements on how to organize the fledgling democracy. For whatever reason, Puntofijo is commonly referred to as Punto Fijo in the English-speaking world, a convention that we observe in this volume. 2. Robert Dahl (1971, 1989) argues that all polyarchies share seven characteristics: (1) elected o≈cials; (2) free and fair elections; (3) inclusive su√rage; (4) the right to run for o≈ce; (5) freedom of expression; (6) alternative information sources; and (7) associational autonomy. Dahl (1989) further argues that these institutions are necessary for representative democracy on a large scale (the nation-state), but they may not be su≈cient for all the attributes of classical democracy, including full participation and the pursuit of the common good. As Collier and Levitsky (1997) demonstrate, there are various regime subtypes, including diminished subtypes of democracy. O’Donnell (2002b) disaggregates the political regime from the broader political system when he defines democracy more broadly than the formal regime (rules of accession to government). For O’Donnell, democracy also encompasses the state (bureaucracies, rule of law, and collective identity ) and socioeconomic context. O’Donnell goes on to argue that a country may have a democratic political regime (with elections as the route to accession to power) without a fully democratic state (2002a). This volume explores the dynamics of political regime change; it does not focus on some potentially broader context of democratic development . 3. The movement away from dictatorial rule and toward more liberal and democratic governance in southern Europe, Latin America, and post-Communist Eastern Europe has, thanks to Samuel Huntington (1991), become known widely as the ‘‘Third Wave of Democracy.’’ Huntington also discusses an earlier ‘‘Second Wave of Democracy ’’; it began with the Allied victory over the Axis powers in 1945 but retreated before a ‘‘reverse wave’’ of bureaucratic authoritarianism which swept away most second-wave democracies. In Latin America second-wave democracies survived in Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela. 4. This is similar to Carother’s ‘‘feckless democracy’’ (2002) and draws on Gil Yepes (1978). 5. This shares some characteristics with Carother’s ‘‘dominant-power syndrome’’ (2002), O’Donnell’s ‘‘delegative democracies’’ (1994), and Diamond’s twilight zone democracies (1999). 308 Notes to Pages 7–40 6. Distributive crisis refers not only to declining state income but also to administrative , extractive, and managerial capacity. c h a p t e r o n e : The Normalization of Punto Fijo Democracy 1. This theme permeates reporting by the New York Times (December 17 and 18, 1961) of President John F. Kennedy’s visit to Venezuela. 2. For example, see Levine, 1994, and Karl, 1995. 3. Carrasquero and Welsch, 2001: 69–88. 4. Brewer-Carías (1988: 383–84) also discusses the existence of a Document of Motives. 5. The Bicameral Commission for Constitutional Reform was never the innovator in these discussions. Venezuelan constitutions have always incorporated the idea of limitations and restrictions through law, although less directly. The 1961 constitution simply clarified and strengthened the economic rights of the Venezuelan citizens. 6. URD broke with President Betancourt after twenty-one months over his support of the United States against Fidel Castro. For an informative account of URD’s role in the Betancourt government, see Alexander, 1964: 98–100. 7. Most URD leaders professed loyalty to the 1957–59 elite settlement, and Ojeda was expelled from the party. 8. Policy types, as used throughout this chapter, are classified according to perceptions of how likely it is that coercion will have to be employed in order to implement the outcome produced by the policy process. Regulatory policy significantly increases the probability that coercion must be employed, when compared with decisions that can be implemented through distribution. For a more complete analysis of the implications of policy types for political stability, see Lowi, 1964, 1972, and Myers, 1994. c h a p t e r t wo : Urban Poor and Political Order 1. This development has been examined closely by social scientists. See, for example, García-Guadilla, 1992; Gómez Calcaño, 1987, 1998; Levine, 1998b; Levine and Crisp, 1995; Navarro, 1995; and Salamanca, 1995b. 2. One organization warrants specific mention. The Centro al Servicio de la Acción Popular (CESAP; Center for the Service of Popular Action), which predates much of Venezuelan civil society, has sponsored a...
OR
Buy This Book in Print