The Unraveling of Representative Democracy in Venezuela

11 Public Opinion, Political Socialization, and Regime Stabilization

c h a p t e r e l e v e n Public Opinion, Political Socialization, and Regime Stabilization José Antonio Gil Yepes This chapter examines the relationship between public opinion, political socialization , and regime stability in post-1958 Venezuela by addressing four puzzles. The first asks how the innovative policies pursued by those who founded the Punto Fijo polity created opinions that facilitated regime normalization and political stability. The second analyzes how and why support for that political regime decayed and when this occurred. The third puzzle is to identify the political attitudes that post-1958 democracy bequeathed to the Fifth Republic and assess the e√orts of President Hugo Chávez Frías to build upon and transform them. Finally, this research explores whether existing attitudes toward the Bolivarian Revolution’s performance are positive enough to ensure its viability. Public opinion surveys, focus group research, and electoral results provide the data for the analysis that follows. Innovative Policies and Normalization of Representative Democracy The founders of Venezuela’s Punto Fijo regime crafted a political regime in which power was highly centralized. In this respect, they took the road traveled 232 José Antonio Gil Yepes by their predecessors, including General Marcos Pérez Jiménez. They also held egalitarian attitudes that led them to support free elections based on universal su√rage as the preferred procedure for political participation and renewing the political leadership. On the other hand, the founding fathers of Punto Fijo democracy (Rómulo Betancourt, Rafael Caldera, and Jóvito Villalba), viewed many liberties and pluralism based on the open expression of demands to be the prerogative of political elites. They reserved the exercise of these dimensions of power for party executives, the president of the republic, high-level bureaucrats, and congressional leaders. In other words, Punto Fijo’s pluralism was highly limited.∞ Party leaders and government o≈cials discouraged interest groups from articulating their demands when political elites were engaged in rule making. Groups tied to the political parties were expected to support the policies and priorities on which party leaders had reached agreement. Interests that enjoyed autonomy from the political parties (and sometimes the groups tied to the political parties themselves) were allowed to participate in policy-implementing decisions. Again, however, they had minimal influence in deciding the content of public policy. The mechanisms favored by the dominant political parties (Acción Democr ática [AD; Democratic Action] and Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente: Partido Social Cristiano [COPEI; Committee of Independent Electoral Political Organization: Social Christian Party]) for distributing instrumental rewards varied. They reflected the structural complexity of the polity. But for all, elites as well as the masses, the rewards for working within guidelines established by the political elite were substantial. Supportive groups received generous allocations from the abundant oil money that flowed into the state’s co√ers from the mid-1960s until the late 1980s. Symbolic rewards complemented instrumental rewards. Punto Fijo democrats were sensitive to the importance of symbolic rewards in gaining and retaining support. The symbolic rewards that AD and COPEI leaders dangled before the economic and social elites were support for anticommunism, influence for the church, nationalism, and political liberties. To the masses they o√ered unity and democracy, which translated into direct, secret, and universal su√rage; limited freedom of political expression for individuals; and anticommunism . Unity and democracy became the buzzwords to symbolize all that was good. Dictatorship and communism symbolized the bad, along with peculado , or o≈cial corruption. Public Opinion, Political Socialization, and Regime Stabilization 233 Table 11.1. Components of Social Mobilization to Induce Political and Economic Legitimacy Democracy 1958 Import Substitution 1960s Market Economy 1989–92 Decentralization 1984–93 Existing crisis Repression Unemployment Deficit Government ine≈ciency Shared goal Reestablish democracy Substitute imports create jobs ? Better public services A clear message ‘‘Unity’’ ‘‘Buy Venezuelan’’ None ‘‘Decentralization’’ A common motivation Liberty Nationalism ? Accountability Public opinion Mobilized Mobilized Not mobilized Mobilized Leadership Party and sectorial leaders Rómulo Betancourt Carlos Andres Pérez (Pressure from all sectors and the masses for decentralization) Intermediary leaders Eugenio Mendoza (business) Alejandro Hernández (business) None COPRE’s presidents Specialized institution for elite mobilization Junta Patriótica ProVenezuela Consejo Nacional de Concentración COPRE Presidential Commission for State Reform Use of massive political communication Very intensive Very intensive Very low Moderate Level of success Very high High Low Medium...