Plato and the Virtue of Courage

Chapter Two: Noble Courage Socrates and Laches

laches A fundamental question: why this particular title? That the dialogue bears the name of Laches (and not, say, Nicias) suggests that understanding him and his opinion of courage is somehow integral to understanding the dialogue. We have seen that Laches cares a great deal about courage. He is willing to be examined by Socrates on the subject because he has witnessed Socrates’ valor on the battle field. Indeed, not only does Laches defer to Socrates when asked about what constitutes a noble study or practice (180c; see also 181a–b, 184c), he even maintains that he submits to Socrates’ scrutiny “with great pleasure” (189a). Despite his stated willingness to have Socrates teach and refute him (189b), Laches does not seem to think that he has much to learn from Socrates. From the outset, he appears confident that he su;ciently understands virtue in general and courage in particular. More precisely, if he does not think he understands these subjects perfectly, he thinks he understands them enough not to shy away from Socrates’ implied challenge, which is made possible by Laches’ argument that spear-fighting is not worth learning because, not only does it not cultivate virtue, it even corrupts it. As we have noted, he cannot responsibly make this argument unless he has at least a solid grasp of what virtue is. So when Socrates asks him how “we” can counsel anyone about virtue “if we did not at all know even what virtue happens to be” (190b–c), he is not merely identifying the conditions the generals must meet if they are to be deemed worthy to dispense advice —he is also implying that Laches must either understand virtue or admit that Noble Courage Socrates and Laches chapter two he has behaved shamefully. Whether or not this consideration a=ects Laches’ response , he emphatically agrees with Socrates that “we” know what virtue is (190c).1 Socrates, however, does not ask him about virtue per se; it would be a lot of work to “examine the whole of virtue straightaway” (190c). Rather, he says that they should more modestly focus on a part of virtue, the part that “the many” think “learning about armor” is really about: courage (190d). Confident that he understands courage, Laches swears “by Zeus” that courage is “not hard to state” (190e4). His swearing underlines both how much he cares about courage and how certain he is of its meaning.2 His certainty is shattered when Socrates reveals the deep confusion in his view of courage. Indeed, the dialogue may be named after him because of the character of this confusion. Laches takes to an extreme the position of those who most esteem courage, those who believe, as he does, that courage is not only noble but also “among the noblest things” (192c). The problem with this position is that it turns out to be very hard for Laches to reconcile his admiration for courage as surpassingly noble with the view that it is also a means to some further good. Laches initially accepts the view that courage accompanied by prudence is “noble and good” (192c8–9). On its face, this claim is unremarkable; it merely implies that courage is most a virtue when one accomplishes through its exercise something good for oneself, for others, or for both. But as the conversation proceeds, Laches retreats from this view. When Socrates indicates the skillfulness with which the prudently courageous man behaves , Laches begins to think less well of prudent courage. He winds up arguing that what is truly admirable is not prudent but foolish courage, that is, the courage of the man who lacks both knowledge and skill. As Laches listens to Socrates’ examples of prudent courage, he reveals that he in fact thinks that the nobility of courage is independent of its goal. But Laches never quite renounces his initial agreement with Socrates that courage accompanied by prudence is noble and good. He is torn between the two perspectives. His confusion represents a quintessentially human confusion, the exploration of which will illuminate the reasons why we are uncertain about the essence of courage. standing one’s ground Laches’ confident first attempt to define courage seems promising: if someone were “willing to remain in the ranks and defend himself [amunesthai] against the enemies and should not flee,” he would, according to Laches, be courageous (190e). It is hardly surprising that Laches defines courage in terms of battle; not 48 PLATO AND...